Amidst public administration reforms in Viet Nam, it is essential to review the performance of the Government and local governments in state management and functioning. With seven years of implementation in Viet Nam, PAPI has provided a wealth of useful data and has acted as a channel to provide citizens’ voices and feedback to the Government and local governments. PAPI findings have substantially supported the National Assembly, the Government and local authorities in monitoring the effectiveness of socio-economic policies and promoting sustainable development in Viet Nam.

Ms Lê Thúy Nga
National Assembly Delegate,
Vice Chairwoman of the Judicial Committee of the National Assembly

At the local level, after five years of implementation, PAPI has become an important tool to provide user feedback on the performance of governance and public administration of local authorities and public administration agencies. With the increasing significance it plays, PAPI needs to be continued and should be welcomed as it provides local governments with motivation to improve their performance and competencies, contributing to the development of the country.

Mr Nguyễn Văn Hùng
Vice Director, Da Nang Institute for Socio-Economic Development

After five years of nationwide surveys, PAPI annual reports have become useful tools to reflect objective citizen feedback and perspectives on the performance of the public sector and local governments across all 63 provinces. In particular, PAPI has provided a reliable source of information and data for policy discussions on institutional and public administration reforms in our Academy’s high-level leadership and executive training programmes.

Professor, Dr Trương Ngắc Tấn
President of the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics

Thirty years of Doi Moi reforms have made Vietnam a remarkable development success story. The country’s extreme poverty rate has declined from close to 60 percent in the early 1990s to three percent today. Regarding several human development indicators, Vietnam is on par with countries with much higher levels of income. However, the reform agenda needs to be pursued to ensure further development in many areas. Vietnam needs to improve its governance to help boost accountability and transparency and to create opportunities for citizen feedback on the performance of the public administration. PAPI has proven to be an effective measure to achieve this purpose.

H.E. Ms Beatrice Maser Mallor
Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland
VIET NAM PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCE
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PERFORMANCE INDEX (PAPI) 2015

Measuring citizens’ experiences

Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES)
Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Responsive and accountable institutions are developed when policymakers, public officials and citizens repeatedly interact in iterative processes. In each iteration, policymakers evaluate progress and adjust strategies, public officials review implementation and adapt their disposition, and citizens engage with their experiences and expectations. In Viet Nam, these iterative processes are reinforced annually with the information and data provided by citizens through PAPI. In a nutshell, PAPI has reinforced these iterations and has helped to put Viet Nam on the path to institutionalizing governance-informed development by putting citizens at the centre and connecting policymakers and public officials with citizens’ experiences of public administration.

Mr Jairo Acuña-Alfaro
Global Policy Advisor, Governance and Peacebuilding, UNDP New York
Lead architect of PAPI from inception to implementation from 2009-2014

PAPI is one of the best surveys measuring people’s expectations regarding public service delivery in Vietnam. It is the most useful indicator to monitor and improve the quality of public administration at the local and central levels. In future, PAPI can best serve the Government in its endeavour to make the administration more inclusive of the population’s needs and better able to deliver more sustainable results.

H. E. Mr Bruno Angelet
Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Vietnam

PAPI has indeed revealed citizen feedback on the quality of governance and public services at the provincial level. Both PAPI and PCI [the Provincial Competitiveness Index commissioned by the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry] have formulated a comprehensive and sustained set of indicators that help facilitate provincial responses and actions to address the needs of citizens and businesses. Ultimately, user satisfaction from both citizens and businesses is the most important goal of the state apparatus at all levels.

Mr Đậu Anh Tuấn
Director, Legislative Department, Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry

We look forward to the new PAPI report every year. It is a valuable source of information on the performance of provinces Canada partners with. More importantly, PAPI is providing a deepening picture of how citizens feel about how their government is doing, which should guide improvements on both the management of government and the services it provides.

H. E. Mr David Devine
Ambassador, Embassy of Canada

PAPI is a significant contribution in efforts to provide robust and realistic evidence of citizen perspectives of the provincial performance of governance and public administration in all 63 provinces. PAPI has helped provincial leaders be aware of citizens’ assessments of the effectiveness of the state apparatus and to identify concrete measures to improve their performance.

Viet Nam has become more integrated into the regional and world economy. Viet Nam is now a member of the ASEAN Economic Community and has signed up to the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and other free trade agreements. It has thus become more urgent for Viet Nam to reform its institutions and improve the quality of public services. I hope that PAPI will [continue to] be improved and will contribute even more substantially to such institutional reforms.

Dr Lê Đăng Doanh
Independent Senior Economist,
Former President of the Central Institute for Economic Management
“Amidst public administration reforms in Viet Nam, it is essential to review the performance of the Government and local governments in state management and functioning. With seven years of implementation in Viet Nam, PAPI has provided a wealth of useful data and has acted as a channel to provide citizens’ voices and feedback to the Government and local governments. PAPI findings have substantially supported the National Assembly, the Government and local authorities in monitoring the effectiveness of socio-economic policies and promoting sustainable development in Viet Nam.”

Ms Le Thi Nga
National Assembly Delegate,
Vice Chairwoman of the Judicial Committee of the National Assembly

“PAPI is a large-scale, rigorous and compelling piece of research, which has increasingly proved its significance in improving provincial performance in governance and public administration in all 63 provinces. Many provinces have used PAPI to reflect on their performance, and have found measures to address their shortcomings and improve their ways of delivering governance and public administration services.

For the north-western region, provincial PAPI scores are generally low. This is partly because of poorer socio-economic development conditions and lower levels of education among the population in the region.

PAPI needs to provide additional analysis of the contexts and conditions of each province, especially those in the north-western region. Also, the way PAPI findings are presented needs to be simplified so that they are easier to understand and remember.”

Mr Lê Văn Lân
Vice Chairman, North-western Region Steering Committee

“Thirty years of Doi Moi reforms have made Vietnam a remarkable development success story. The country’s extreme poverty rate has declined from close to 60 percent in the early 1990s to three percent today. Regarding several human development indicators, Vietnam is on par with countries with much higher levels of income. However, the reform agenda needs to be pursued to ensure further development in many areas. Vietnam needs to improve its governance to help boost accountability and transparency and to create opportunities for citizen feedback on the performance of the public administration. PAPI has proven to be an effective measure to achieve this purpose. Switzerland is pleased to collaborate with UNDP in supporting this important initiative.”

H.E. Ms Beatrice Maser Mallor
Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland

“I congratulate UNDP, CECODES, the Vietnam Fatherland Front and their partners for the release of the 5th Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI). This is a very important project that will help improve the overall standard of public administration and governance in Vietnam, raise the level of transparency and efficiency, and in turn bring about huge benefits for Vietnam’s future development and growth trajectory. While there is always scope for further refinements, the survey methodology has been independently verified and the findings and feedback in the PAPI reports so far cannot be ignored or dismissed.

Policy, ultimately, is implementation. Unless the priorities and policies of the Party and the State are properly implemented by officials, they will just remain on a piece of paper. The surveys conducted by PAPI are extensive and provide a good basis to gauge how policies have been implemented on the ground, as assessed by citizens who interact with provincial authorities. Such feedback is useful in that it offers a “bottom-up” approach so that provincial agencies are aware of their strengths as well as their shortcomings in their public service delivery. PAPI has deservedly enjoyed a positive endorsement from senior Vietnamese leaders and should continue to receive priority attention by the various stakeholders in this country.

I urge all provincial authorities to attach great importance to this process and work with UNDP, CECODES, the Vietnam Fatherland Front and their partners, and to treat all feedback and comments reflected in this year’s PAPI report in a constructive manner, so as to improve the performance, efficiency and accountability of the various public sector agencies at the provincial and local levels. Foreign investors will increasingly look at the PAPI ranking of provinces when making investment decisions.”

H. E. Mr Ng Teck Hean
Ambassador, Embassy of Singapore
“PAPI has been a convincing tool that reflects citizen assessment of transparency, vertical accountability and local government performance in all 63 provinces. It has received attention from a number of local governments that have developed their action plans and taken concrete steps to improve public service quality and promote citizen participation. I hope that PAPI findings will reach local authorities and the public so that all stakeholders can join hands to facilitate a servicing public administration system that is capable of observing citizen rights and responding to citizen needs. Indeed, I have shared PAPI findings with local officials and the information was positively received.”

Ms Ngô Thị Thu Hà
Vice Director, Center for Education Promotion and Empowerment of Women (CEPEW)

“The year 2015 was the first year of collaboration between the Board of Delegates’ Affairs under the National Assembly Standing Committee and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide training for People’s Council members on how to use PAPI findings to support their oversight and policymaking. Although it was the first time we collaborated, the training activities were effective. People’s Council members from more than 30 provinces highly appreciated the three regional training workshops, which helped them better understand PAPI and how to use it effectively in oversight and policymaking. The participants also suggested that such training be continued and scaled up to cover all provinces, so that People’s Councils across the country will have an additional channel of information and data to enable more effective People’s Councils.”

Mr Ngô Tự Nam
Deputy Director, Board of Delegates’ Affairs, National Assembly Standing Committee

“PAPI is an invaluable source of information for researchers and civil society, since it is based directly on the perceptions and experiences of Vietnamese citizens. PAPI data helps Oxfam and our local partners to design appropriate programme activities relating to governance, participation and budget transparency. It is also a compelling evidence basis for advocacy that improves policy frameworks and implementation. I hope and expect that PAPI will continue to be used by the Vietnamese government and society as a tool for greater transparency and accountability.”

Ms Nguyễn Lê Hoa
Deputy Country Director, Oxfam in Vietnam

“We at Vietnam Law and Legal Forum always consider PAPI a reliable and useful source of information for reference. We hope that PAPI will become an official annual index for central and local governments to reference in their efforts to build a transparent and effective public administration.”

Mr Nguyễn Minh
Editor-in-Chief, Vietnam Law and Legal Forum, Vietnam News Agency

“PAPI came as a breath of fresh air to push reforms in provinces, making provincial leaders think and act about how to maintain or improve their performance, if they do not wish to be named and shamed in front of their peers in the media. PAPI has provided the media with a valuable wealth of reference information about trends in provincial and regional performance [in governance and public administration]. The media has welcomed PAPI because there is rigour in the survey methods and reliability in the data. Over time, the media has used PAPI, in addition to the PCI and PAR indices, to review and reflect the performance and transparency of the state apparatus. I hope PAPI will be maintained and sustained.”

Ms Nguyễn Thị Vân Anh
Sub-editor in charge of politics and social affairs, VietNamNet
“Measuring corruption and anti-corruption work has proved to be difficult for many countries, including Viet Nam, because of the hidden and sensitive nature of corruption. In order to effectively control and deter corruption and inform anti-corruption efforts, data from reliable, objective and comprehensive measures is needed. Since its debut in 2010, PAPI has been contributing to efforts to establish such an information system in Viet Nam.

With a more robust methodology and better ways of presenting findings, PAPI will be used more frequently, not only by researchers and policymakers, but also by public officials and civil servants so that they can be clear on what is expected from their performance of government functions. PAPI will therefore contribute to a cleaner, stronger and more citizen-centric public administration system.”

Mr Nguyễn Tuấn Anh
Vice Director, Legal Department, Government Inspectorate

“At the local level, after five years of implementation, PAPI has become an important tool to provide user feedback on the performance of governance and public administration of local authorities and public administration agencies. With the increasing significance it plays, PAPI needs to be continued and should be welcomed as it provides local governments with motivation to improve their performance and competencies, contributing to the development of the country.”

Mr Nguyễn Văn Hùng
Vice Director, Da Nang Institute for Socio-Economic Development

“Seven years ago, when PAPI was in its inception stage, there used to be concerns about its impact. Local authorities had doubts about the accuracy of the index, while citizens and survey implementers were concerned about the receptiveness of local authorities to the feedback. Thanks to the persistence, determination and continued refinement of content and methodology of the actors involved in PAPI and the coverage across all 63 provinces for the past seven years, PAPI has become a convincing tool for most stakeholders. For the State, PAPI has provided citizen voices and feedback and it encourages the State to keep up institutional and public administration reforms and public service betterment. For citizens, their awareness and trust in their legitimate rights and responsibilities to join hands to improve the performance of the public sector have risen. With rising demands of the country in development and integration, I hope PAPI will keep playing an important role in developing a citizen-centric civil service sector and promoting the competitiveness and sustainable development of Viet Nam in the future.”

Ms Pham Chi Lan
Senior Economist, Former Vice President of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry

“When frustrated with cumbersome administrative procedures, everyone cries out. However, just complaining will not help much. We need to point out where and in which particular area the state apparatus is problematic. Citizens have high expectations of the rigorous reforms being undertaken by local governments. PAPI measures citizens’ perspectives, helping provincial authorities review the ‘health condition’ of the state apparatus of each province. And, the western provinces will look at the eastern provinces. Binh Phuoc would like to catch up with Binh Duong. Quang Nam compares itself with Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh. Southern provinces compare themselves with their northern peers. Over the years, PAPI has become a significant tool that measures and compares the quality of local governance across all provinces thanks to its advanced, reliable and state-of-the-art methodology.”

Associate Professor, Dr Phạm Duy Nghĩa
Lecturer, Fulbright Economics Teaching Programme, University of Economics, Ho Chi Minh City
“I would like to highlight the importance of the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) in improving the services provided to citizens. PAPI captures and reflects the experiences of Vietnamese citizens in all 63 provinces in policymaking, policy implementation and the monitoring of public service delivery of local authorities.

A few years ago in Belgium we changed the name of our ministries to ‘services.’ So the Ministry of Education became the Government Service for Education. It reflects a different thinking about governing. PAPI serves the same thinking: government as a service to the citizen.

PAPI gives provincial leaders and administrations an instrument to measure how they are doing compared to their peers and [in servicing] their citizens. It is a tool to identify the priority needs for reform as requested by citizens, learning from [other] provinces.

Therefore, Belgium recommends that it should be considered as an official source of reference by the Government of Vietnam in its efforts to carry out public administration reform. PAPI is a tool that helps the government to assess its own work, and on the basis of this assessment reform the administration to do better. This is why Belgium plans to support three provinces (Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Kon Tum) to become more responsive to the needs of their citizens, based on the information of the PAPI review.”

H. E. Ms Jehanne Roccas
Ambassador, Embassy of Belgium

“After five years of nationwide surveys, PAPI annual reports have become useful tools to reflect objective citizen feedback and perspectives on the performance of the public sector and local governments across all 63 provinces. In particular, PAPI has provided a reliable source of information and data for policy discussions on institutional and public administration reforms in our Academy’s high-level leadership and executive training programmes.”

Professor, Dr Tạ Ngọc Tấn
President of the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics

“The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) report, which has a five-year perspective (from 2011-2015), provides state agencies at both central and local level a rigorous and objective tool to measure local governments’ performance in state management and public service delivery from the citizen’s perspective. PAPI has been implemented to facilitate a service-minded state apparatus and sustainable development in Viet Nam. It has become a reliable monitoring tool that has also been a source of inspiration for other countries. PAPI, the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), which has been launched every year since 2006 by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Public Administration Reform Index (PAR Index), developed by the Ministry of Home Affairs and conducted yearly since 2012, have become reliable sources of data and information about Viet Nam’s performance in governance reform and economic integration.

I believe that PAPI will continue receiving technical support from the international community in the period from 2016-2020. I also hope that PAPI will receive more attention and support not only from the Viet Nam Fatherland Front but also legislative and executive agencies. With such support, PAPI will confirm its role as an annual index, among other indices, for government agencies at all level to use to gauge their progress in policy making and governance improvement so as to meet the country’s objectives of fast and sustainable development and modernization.”

Dr Thang Văn Phúc
President of the Viet Nam Institute of Development Studies
PAPI Advisory Board Lead
“While state agencies are used to self-assessment when evaluating their performance, PAPI reflects both citizens’ experiences with and perception of the services being provided by state agencies. In addition, PAPI objectively captures the state-citizen relationship on the way towards a state apparatus that serves the people. I hope PAPI will be expanded and will maintain its independence and objectivity.”

Mr Trần Dương Thịnh
Director, Department for Home Affairs, Thai Nguyen Province

“PAPI provides an opportunity for citizens to speak out about their experience with local government performance in governance and public administration. PAPI also reveals citizens’ knowledge of, care for and trust in the State. In addition, PAPI helps citizens identify what they are aware and unaware of, and promotes their interest to better understand the governance and public administration mechanisms in place.

PAPI helps state agencies to look into themselves, creates a more level playing field for citizens to access public administrative services, makes the system more transparent and accountable and reduces corruption. I hope that PAPI will continue to be a platform for citizens to exercise their oversight roles so as to contribute to improving the performance of state agencies.”

Mr Trần Long Vi
Project Officer at Green Youth Collective, Hoi An, Quang Nam
(one of nearly 400 enumerators for the 2015 PAPI survey)

“As one of the pioneering indexes measuring provincial performance in governance and public administration in Viet Nam, PAPI has helped policymakers review where they are in their performance in comparison with other provinces, and has provided a wealth of data for national and international researchers interested in understanding public administration. Many studies using PAPI data have been conducted. However, PAPI still needs to be improved to serve the needs of the research community. For instance, there are peculiarities in the experiences with citizen participation, transparency, vertical accountability, control of corruption, public administrative procedures and public service delivery between urban and rural citizens. Therefore, questions reflecting these differences should be designed. Samples should also be designed in such a way that when urban and rural weights are applied, the voices of urban and rural citizens can be reflected in a representative manner for a particular province. In addition, respondents should be able to select responses that express more varied levels of satisfaction, rather than just being satisfied or dissatisfied.”

Dr Trần Thị Bích
Dean of Statistics Department, National Economics University

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FOREWORD

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is a policy monitoring tool that reflects citizen experiences with the performance of central to local governments in governance, public administration and public service delivery. PAPI has helped motivate public officials, civil servants and public employees at different levels and in different sectors to perform better in public sector management and public service delivery. The index ultimately aims at providing better services for citizens and fostering national development.

This 2015 PAPI Report presents the results of the fifth nationwide survey, with data articulating the experiences of 13,995 citizens who were randomly selected and who are a representative sample of different demographic groups across the country. Since the first survey in 2009, almost 75,000 citizens have engaged directly in face-to-face interviews and shared their experiences and assessments of the State’s governance and public administration performance.

To improve and strengthen the quality of the research methodology and survey implementation, in 2015 PAPI underwent a number of important changes. The first change concerns sampling. In order to ensure the rigour and objectivity of the research, one third of communes were re-sampled using the “probability proportional to size” method. Of these communes, the communes which hold the district capitals were retained and all villages in that commune were therefore also retained. The other communes were re-sampled to replace those selected in 2014.

In order to improve the quality of face-to-face interviews, PAPI moved from a paper-based survey to using tablets to carry out the survey. The 2015 PAPI questionnaire, field survey assistance and quality control functions were built into an application that was installed on more than 80 tablets, which were then used for data collection in the field. The tablet-based approach generated a number of positive benefits, such as real-time monitoring of fieldwork. Instant assistance could be provided to field controllers and enumerators and instant monitoring of the data collection progress by each village every day of the fieldwork was possible. Other benefits included real-time data collection, as data was transmitted instantly to PAPI’s cloud data hub, the possibility for random spot checks of collected data to notify research and fieldwork teams of any abnormality and, finally, traditional manual data entry errors were avoided.

A number of new questions were also included to hear citizen voices on several policy developments and to better understand civic knowledge. For example, questions about respondents’ civic knowledge of socio-political affairs, citizen participation in law-making, access to information through the Internet and mobile phone services and access to local government web portals for advice on administrative procedures were included.

The 2015 PAPI Report highlights the overall trends in governance and public administration at the national and provincial level from 2011-2015. Rather than ranking provinces, the report focuses on national and provincial scores in dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators over time. The report also suggests practical measures to improve the quality of policy implementation as well as policy areas that need immediate reform. We hope these suggestions will be useful for the new Government in place from 2016-2021.

PAPI continues to have substantial impact at an international, national and provincial level. At the national level, PAPI is used as a tool to collect citizen feedback and encourage social accountability and it provides helpful information for different state, government and National Assembly agencies. In some sectors (including health care, home affairs, education and inspection), the PAPI methodology has been employed when these sectors established tools to measure user satisfaction with their work and services.
At the provincial level, an increasing number of provinces are using PAPI to improve their performance. As many as two thirds of all 63 provinces have employed PAPI as a monitoring tool to track the performance of local government agencies. At least 26 provinces have issued resolutions, directives or action plans to respond to PAPI findings. For instance, the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee has issued a resolution in which the municipality commits to being among the top five performers in PAPI by 2020. Some provinces hold annual reviews of the PAPI results in order to identify concrete follow-up actions (such as An Giang, Bac Ninh and Thai Nguyen). Thai Nguyen province has even set up a steering committee to improve governance and public administration, which is led by provincial and department leaders. In addition, at least 48 provinces have hosted or organized workshops to look deeper into PAPI findings in order to increase citizen satisfaction with their performance.

At the international level, PAPI continues to be seen as a unique tool to listen to citizen voices. At the 2015 Viet Nam Development Partnership Forum, PAPI was cited by the international donor community as a significant initiative to measure citizen satisfaction with government performance. PAPI is used as means of verification in the United Nations One Plan and in country strategies of international development agencies supporting Viet Nam. PAPI data has also been used by the international and national research community and is freely available on request.

The National Advisory Board, with representatives from state and government agencies and experts on governance and public administration, remains important and provides insights and perspectives on governance and public administration issues. With the Board’s continued guidance and support, the credibility and impact of PAPI data and findings will continue to rise.

The 2015 PAPI Report marks five years of the research being carried out nationwide. The aim is still to contribute to the ongoing efforts to improve governance and public administration performance at the provincial level. As a rich, objective and representative source of data, we expect PAPI to continue to be a useful reference point and policy diagnostic tool for policymakers, government leaders, civil society organizations, the media, scholars and international development partners to better understand and respond to the needs of a middle-income Viet Nam. We also hope it offers useful baseline indicators for citizens and state and government agencies at different levels to gauge the performance of the state sector in governance and public administration during the term of the new Government.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This 2015 PAPI Report is the result of the continued productive partnership between CECODES, VFF-CRT and UNDP. The year 2015 marked the seventh round of collaboration between the implementing partners and the fifth nationwide iteration.

The report is authored by Dr Sarah Dix and Ms Đỗ Thanh Huyền from UNDP, Dr Đặng Ngọc Dinh and Dr Đặng Hoàng Giang from CECODES, Associate Professor of Political Economy, Dr Edmund J. Malesky from Duke University (UNDP international consultant on governance measurement) and Dr Paul Schuler from Arizona University (UNDP international consultant on research quality control). The team also wishes to acknowledge Mr Jairo Acuña-Alfaro, Policy Advisor with UNDP New York and the lead architect of PAPI from 2009-2014, for his insights and advice during the 2015 PAPI cycle.

PAPI surveys are made possible thanks to diligent guidance from the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) and proactive collaboration from provincial to grassroots levels. Special thanks also go to the 13,995 Vietnamese citizens who were randomly selected for the face-to-face interviews. They actively participated in the 2015 PAPI survey by sharing their valuable experiences of interactions with local authorities and perspectives on governance, public administration performance and public service delivery in their localities.

PAPI is guided by a National Advisory Board and sincere thanks are extended to its 24 members for willingly dedicating their time and knowledge towards different PAPI activities and processes.

Gratitude is also extended to the Central Committee of VFF leaders who generously provided timely advice and political support for PAPI research. This is exemplified by VFF committees from provincial to grassroots levels who collaborated with the PAPI research management team during the data collection process, while maintaining their impartiality in the process so that PAPI data can assure its objectivity and high quality.

Valuable support from the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics (HCMA) and its President Dr Tạ Ngọc Tấn, as well as other HCMA leaders and senior experts, in collaborating on different case studies using PAPI data and introducing PAPI findings to the HCMA executive leadership training programmes is also acknowledged. Further gratitude is extended to Mr Ngô Tự Nam, Deputy Director of the Board of Deputies’ Affairs under the National Assembly Standing Committee, and his colleagues, in particular Ms Nguyễn Thị Nga and Mr Nguyễn Đức Lam at the Training Centre for Elected Representatives, for their support in disseminating PAPI findings to Provincial People’s Council members from 30 randomly selected provinces. Thanks also go out to VFF-CRT Vice Director Dr Phạm Thị Hồng and her colleagues, as well as Mr Nguyễn Ngọc Dinh, former Director of the Department for Democracy and Law (VFF Central Committee), for the successful organization of seven regional workshops to disseminate PAPI findings to all 63 provinces in 2015.

Field controllers played a critical role in the 2015 PAPI survey. They include Nguyễn Thị Lan Anh, Phạm Hải Bình, Nguyễn Thị Xuân Dung, Lê Hữu Dũng, Bùi Thị Quế Dương, Vũ Quang Diệp, Đặng Phương Giang, Đoàn Thị Hà, Đặng Ngọc Hải, Nguyễn Tuấn Hải, Nguyễn Thu Hiền, Nguyễn Công Hiền, Lê Văn Hiệp, Nguyễn Văn Hiệu, Nguyễn Văn Hùng, Trọng Thị Huyền, Nguyễn Nhật Linh, Đào Thùy Linh, Lê Thế Linh, Lê Văn Lư, Đinh Y Ly, Trọng Thị Trà My, Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nhã, Kim Thị Nhan, Sửng A Phềnh, Nguyễn Lê Phương, Đặng Thanh Phong, Nguyễn Thị Phương, Đặng Hoàng Phong, Hà Quang Phúc, Lưu Trọng Quang, Nguyễn Thị Quỳnh, Trần Anh Tài, Lê Minh Tâm, Đào Mạnh Tấn, Nguyễn Phương Thảo, Vũ Chiến Thông, Phạm Văn Thịnh, Ngô Thị Thu, Nguyễn Ngọc Tùng, Nguyễn Thị Thanh, Trọng Đình Trọng, Phan Lạc Trung and Dương Quốc Trung. These field controllers all deserve special mention as they ensured the data collection process was fully compliant with strict PAPI procedures and standards.
In addition, thanks must go to the 378 enumerators who were selected from 1,728 applications from final-year university students across Viet Nam. Without these young and enthusiastic interviewers, the data collection process could not have been completed. Special thanks go to Trần Vân Anh and Nguyễn Thành Hưng from the local non-governmental organization Live & Learn for their support in recruiting the enumerators, following a rigorous process of enumerator selection and meeting strict PAPI research requirements.

The move to tablet-based surveys would not have been possible without the great support and services provided by Real-Time Analytics (RTA). Our appreciation in particular goes to RTA Director Dr Lê Đăng Trung and his associates, including Đào Hoàng Bình Thiên, Đặng Thế Vinh, Nguyễn Thị Hồng Linh and Tăng Thị Hiền, for the days and nights they spent working to ensure that the 2015 PAPI tablet-based survey worked, the website operated smoothly, real-time data collection functioned and that field support services were available every day.

Great thanks also go to Dr Phùng Đức Tùng and his colleagues from the Mekong Development Research Institute for sharing their invaluable experience of conducting tablet-based research with the PAPI team.

The work of Dr Lê Thi Nghé from CECODES is recognized for her pivotal role in administering the fieldwork, as are the contributions from Mr Nguyễn Văn Phú and Mr Nguyễn Đức Tri from CECODES for their effective coordination with provincial VFF committees during the data collection process. Dr Phạm Minh Tri from CECODES followed up on the design of the 2015 tablet-based questionnaire and collaborated with the RTA team when required.

Thanks are also extended to W. G Technology Solutions for its support in the development of the interactive www.papi.org.vn website. In addition, Dr Nguyễn Việt Cường from the National Economics University generously helped by producing the coloured maps portraying provincial performance levels. Ms Pernille Goodall, a UNDP copy editor and communications consultant, timely and diligently supported with copy-editing the English version of this report. Mr Nguyễn Việt Dũng, a young creative designer helped with turning important findings into infographics.

Last but not least, generous funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is gratefully acknowledged, together with funds from the One Plan Fund of the UN and UNDP in Viet Nam.
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Note: The list is in alphabetical order by family name.

(*) Mr. Hoàng Hải played a proactive role in establishing the partnership between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front Review, CECODES and UNDP Viet Nam in the first two years of nationwide PAPI implementation. He passed away in late March 2016 in Ha Noi.
SNAPSHOT OF PAPI FROM 2009-2015

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<td>Citizens are at the heart of Viet Nam’s development. As ‘end-users’ of public administration and public services they are fully capable of assessing the performance of the State and local authorities, and supporting the State in establishing a State that is “of the people, by the people and for the people”.</td>
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**Method:** Face-to-face interviews

**Who:** 74,899 citizens since 2009
- 2015: 13,955 (54.1% women)
- 2014: 13,552 (52.9% women)
- 2013: 13,892 (52.7% women)
- 2012: 13,747 (52.6% women)
- 2011: 13,642 (52.9% women)
- 2010: 5,568 (30 provinces; 47.5% women)
- 2009: 543 (3 provinces; 40.3% women)

**Duration:** From 45-60 minutes on average

**Where:** Across all 63 provinces and municipalities in Viet Nam since 2011, covering
- 207 districts
- 414 communes
- 828 villages

**Sampling:** International state-of-the-art methodological standards: probability proportional to size and random selection

**Implementing partners:**
- Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES)
- Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

**Information gateway:**
- Website: www.papi.org.vn
- Twitter: @PAPI_Vietnam
- Facebook: www.facebook.com/papivn
- YouTube: www.youtube.com/user/PAPIVietNam
The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is a policy monitoring tool that reliably assesses citizen experiences and satisfaction with government performance at the national and sub-national levels. PAPI aims to improve the performance of local authorities to meet their citizens’ needs in two ways. First, it creates constructive competition and promotes learning among local authorities. Second, it enables citizens to benchmark their local government’s performance and advocate for improvement. It does this by offering a unique opportunity for a nationally and provincially representative sample of the population to provide feedback to government, as well as an opportunity for government to hear citizens’ voices. In doing so, PAPI is helping to build a performance culture within national and provincial governments to support better policymaking, management of public resources and public service delivery.

The past five years of annual nationwide PAPI surveys coincide with the 2011-2015 government term, providing both a retrospective evaluation of the Government’s accomplishments and a benchmark to gauge performance during the next term. In addition to six performance indices – which are based on a core set of questions every year – the 2015 PAPI survey includes new questions on a range of topics. Responses from 13,955 citizens in 2015 offer policymakers a look at what issues citizens care most about as well as policy measures that can address citizens’ rising expectations.

Over the years, PAPI has been used by a wide range of stakeholders both inside and outside of Viet Nam for government performance assessment and policy review. For example, a growing number of provincial government authorities have responded to PAPI’s findings. To date, over 26 provinces have used PAPI in their action plans, directives and resolutions to improve their implementation of general governance measures, administrative procedures and service delivery. More than 40 provinces have hosted workshops to look more closely at citizen feedback of their performance. In addition, PAPI data and information has played an important role in an emerging number of policy documents from think tanks, international development partners and universities.

The impact PAPI is having is testament to how data and evidence is helping improve public policies in Viet Nam. It is also a reminder that the data and indicators portrayed by PAPI are measures and not targets. An important message for policymakers and practitioners is that scores should be read as an opportunity to assess performance across a wide range of issues, and not as a critique or call to improve a particular score. What PAPI scores reflect are structural issues citizens encounter when experiencing provincial performance in governance and public administration. The scores act as mirrors of the overall performance, and provincial authorities should focus on identifying actionable measures to fix problematic areas. The ultimate objective of PAPI is to provide national and provincial governments with the evidence they need to improve the reflection
seen in the mirror. Any attempts to change PAPI scores without actual performance improvement will not help increase or sustain citizens’ satisfaction with what they experience in the everyday performance of their local government. Rather, as PAPI findings have shown, provinces taking a comprehensive and systematic approach to improving their performance create benefits for both citizens and local governments.

Structurally, this report is consistent with how previous PAPI reports have been organized. As a public good, the PAPI report is accompanied by the website www.papi.org.vn, which provides detailed and up-to-date information, free of charge, on provincial profiles, case studies and policy responses.

**National Trends in Governance and Public Administration Performance**

Looking across the six dimensions that PAPI measures, the 2015 results reveal a dip in performance in the first five measures. Specifically, there was a substantial drop in scores in the transparency and control of corruption dimensions, and a significant decline in local level participation and vertical accountability. There was also a slight decrease in the performance of public administrative procedures in comparison to previous years. On a positive note, public service delivery scores continued to increase modestly.

Most noticeably, the transparency dimension declined sharply, falling more than 7% in 2015 compared to previous years. This is partly because of less public awareness of poverty lists and, among those who have seen the lists, less confidence in their accuracy as compared to previous years. Also, fewer citizens were aware of the commune budget and expenditure information and did not feel confident about the accuracy of this information. In addition, there was less publicity of local land-use plans and land price frames, and citizens had fewer opportunities to comment on land-use plans. The issue of compensation for land seizure remains problematic, with ethnic minorities proving to be less satisfied with compensation levels than ethnic Kinh.

The updated PAPI findings continue to show the endemic nature of corruption in Viet Nam. Overall, the control of corruption dimension fell by 3% in 2015. This is because in a number of indicators, such as bribes in primary education and bribes for land use rights certificates, scores are worse than before. Citizens across the country consider nepotism and bribery in the public sector to be prevalent, and they sense a lack of willingness to fight corruption on the part of the local government and citizens themselves. Results from a new question on the issues of greatest concern to citizens show that corruption was the third most concerning issue, after personal economic issues (such as poverty, employment and income) and roads (which are essential for transport and commerce).

Another problematic area is the decline in citizen participation in political life and policymaking. The indicator on opportunities for participation has continued to fall since 2011. As noted in the 2014 PAPI Report, much of this decline is likely due to the fact that the latest round of National Assembly and People’s Council elections was four years ago, in 2011. With elections coming up in 2016, this indicator will be one to watch in the next PAPI report. On participation in law-making, only 13% of respondents across the country reported being asked to participate in the drafting of ordinances and laws. Participants were much more likely to be men, party members, members of mass organizations or have higher levels of education.

Based on a review of the national results, the following recommendations are made for policy interventions and actions in 2016 and beyond:

1. While the 2013 Land Law may have tightened procedures, more work needs to be done to ensure that land-use plans and land price frames are publicized and that compensations for land seizures are more fair for land users of different demographic backgrounds. In particular, a closer examination is necessary of why ethnic minorities report receiving lower levels of compensation or no compensation at all for land seized.

2. Viet Nam must step up its efforts to curb corruption. Despite the high-level attention paid to the issue, the 2015 PAPI results show that corruption is pervasive. Effective anti-corruption action plans are needed, in addition to greater willingness of public officials and civil servants to curb corruption at all levels of government.
3. To increase citizen participation all voters, especially women, should be encouraged to vote directly in the 2016 elections. Also, the rule of ‘one person, one vote’ needs to be observed by both electoral committees and voters.

**Civic Knowledge, Access to Information and Political Participation**

As Viet Nam prepares for its 2016 National Assembly election, the 2015 PAPI Report examines in detail the factors that determine citizen participation in voting and in contributing opinions on laws. As different citizens have different interests, views and experiences, encouraging participation from a demographically representative group of citizens is essential to ensure that the feedback the Government hears is representative of the country.

Findings from the analysis show that factors such as gender, education and mass organization membership impact citizen participation in Viet Nam through political knowledge and access to information. With regard to elections, the PAPI survey shows that gender, ethnicity, mass organization membership and education directly impact voter participation. Women, ethnic minorities, those who are less educated and those who are not members of mass organizations are less likely to vote. Political knowledge and access to information also play a role, with politically uninformed citizens being less likely to participate in elections.

However, in terms of participation in law-making the picture is different. As mentioned earlier, participation in local government discussions on laws or ordinances is low, at only 13%. Party membership is by far the largest predictor of whether or not an individual is asked to participate. A closer look at the survey results suggests that many more citizens are willing and potentially interested in contributing, but are currently disengaged from the process.

The challenge of how to increase political participation is clearly a multifaceted problem. The PAPI 2015 findings suggest the following:

1. Mobilizing more women and minorities to vote in elections and increasing their awareness of and interest in politics is important. The less educated and those who are not members of mass organizations should also be encouraged to vote. In general, greater political knowledge and access to information have the potential to increase the number of people who vote and to make voting more representative of Viet Nam as a whole.

2. To increase citizen participation in policymaking, greater efforts could be made to include a broader representation of society. Including citizens outside local political networks leads to better decisions because it brings new expertise to the table and helps tailor local initiatives more closely to the needs of citizens.

3. There is the potential for a virtuous circle to develop. Convincing underrepresented citizens that their voice matters in policy creation, implementation and monitoring gives them a greater stake in the process and outcomes, which in turn encourages them to seek out more information and education on the issues. As a result, policy decisions will be improved because of the higher quality of information available to decision makers. From the citizen perspective, greater participation enhances legitimacy and ultimately leads to greater compliance with the law.

**Provincial Performance in 2015 and a Five-Year Comparison**

The 2015 PAPI Report also looks at provincial performance with an analysis of trends at dimensional, sub-dimensional and indicator levels in 2015 and over time. This section targets local-level administrators and policymakers by examining variations in provincial performance, as well as between provinces in the same region. Not only does PAPI identify good and poor performers, it also enables good practices at the provincial level to be shared with provinces with similar socio-economic and geographic characteristics.

Overall, the better performing provinces in 2015 are found in the north-eastern, central and south-eastern regions of the country. The poorest performing provinces are found along the northern border and in the south-central and Central Highland regions. These geographic patterns have been consistent over time since 2011.
The efforts of local governments in Nam Dinh, Ha Tinh, Quang Tri, Da Nang and Long An, who have all been in the top performing group in overall provincial performance for the last five years, should be acknowledged. Thai Binh has been in the top performing group since 2012. At the other end, Lai Chau has been in the poorest performing group since 2011 and Ninh Thuan has been rated poorly since 2012. Seven provinces (Bac Ninh, Can Tho, Tra Vinh, Ninh Binh, Tay Ninh, Phu Tho and Ha Tinh) have improved significantly since 2011, with an increase in their aggregate unweighted scores between 9% and 11%. Meanwhile, 13 provinces have seen significant drops in their scores over the course of five years, with Ba Ria-Vung Tau and Binh Duong dropping the most, as compared to their 2011 baselines.

For poorer performing provinces to catch up with better performing ones, it is important for local governments to systematically look at the specific indicators that show where they have performed well and where they need to improve. By creating action plans to respond to gaps, and implementing them, local governments are able to increase citizens’ satisfaction. It is also important to create equity in access to good governance and public administration, especially for women, ethnic minorities, young people and citizens who are not party members. Together, these actions will help Viet Nam harness its human potential, benefit the country’s development and support the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, which Viet Nam has committed to.

Participation at Local Levels: Practice Citizens’ Constitutional Right

Participation in political, social and economic life is a Vietnamese citizen’s constitutional right, enshrined in the country’s Grassroots Democracy Ordinance and other legislation. As such, citizen participation is a fundamental aspect of governance in Viet Nam. PAPI measures citizens’ knowledge of their participation rights and how they exercise them.

Participation at the local level remains limited in the aspects PAPI measures, with scores in the three sub-dimensions (knowledge of the right to participate, opportunities to participate and quality of village head elections) declining compared to the 2011 baselines. Village head elections remain largely symbolic, with widespread practices such as having just one candidate and candidates being suggested by the authorities in place. The ‘voluntary contribution’ sub-dimension score was more positive, as citizen participation in starting a local infrastructure project was higher in 2015.

Most of the best performing provinces in 2015 are in the north-eastern and central regions. This pattern has existed since 2011 and seems to have become even stronger in the north-central part of the country during the past five years. Thai Binh and Ha Tinh have been in the best performing group for four years in a row. Overall, there has been a significant downward trend in citizen participation in two thirds of the 63 provinces between 2011 and 2015. The largest drops are in Lang Son, Son La, Lai Chau and Ba Ria-Vung Tau, where provincial dimensional scores dropped by at least 25% over five years. The north-western province of Lai Chau has been in the poorest performing group since 2011.

Improving citizen participation in local governance would not require a large financial investment from the state budget. It, however, needs strong commitment from relevant state agencies and local governments to putting the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance into force and to engaging citizens in political life and policymaking. The upcoming 2016 National Assembly and People’s Council elections also offer an opportunity to ensure ‘one person, one vote’ and greater participation in voting.

Transparency: Observe Citizens’ Rights to Know

PAPI measures citizens’ “rights to know” about state policies that affect their everyday lives and livelihoods. Transparency here is based on sub-indicators in three areas: transparency of poverty lists, commune budgets and expenditures, and local land-use planning and pricing. Information relating to these is required by the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance and recent legislation to be made publicly available so citizens across the country can “know, discuss, do and verify”.

As indicated earlier, transparency declined sharply due to the downturn in almost every measure in 2015 in most provinces. Among the 63 provinces, 11 saw improvements of more than 5% in 2015 compared to 2011, while 17 saw a significant decrease over
time. More northern and central provinces are found in the group of better performers than southern ones. In a number of provinces, there is consistent performance over time. For instance, Nam Dinh and Quang Tri have been in the best performing group for five consecutive years. Meanwhile, Lai Chau, Bac Lieu and Kien Giang have been in the poorest performing group since 2011.

To improve transparency, it is important for local governments to find and adapt different means of disclosing trustworthy information to citizens with different demographic backgrounds. This can be done through government portals at provincial and district levels, although as PAPI findings show only about 25% of respondents have Internet at home and very few (about 7%) go onto the Internet to search for information about land price frames. For this reason, in rural and remote areas notice boards at the commune level or loudspeakers at the village level would help disseminate information.

**Vertical Accountability: Facilitate Citizens’ Rights to Discuss and Verify**

This dimension measures key ‘vertical accountability’ aspects, including interactions with local authorities and the coverage and effectiveness of People’s Inspection Boards (PIBs) and Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs). These mechanisms help to make local governments and public officials accountable to their citizens.

Overall, in most provinces vertical accountability has slightly decreased as compared to previous years. The largest drops in 2015 relate to the presence and effectiveness of PIBs and CISBs, which are set up to represent citizens on oversight at the grassroots level. For instance, only 30% of citizens surveyed are aware of a PIB in their locality and only 19% of citizens are aware of CISBs in their communities. Despite higher frequencies nationwide of citizen-government interactions at the grassroots level, the effectiveness of such interactions was lower in 2015.

Most of the top and high-average performers in this dimension for the 2011-2015 period are north-central provinces. Notably, Da Nang, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh and Quang Tri have been rated highly on citizen interactions with local authorities. Bac Ninh’s dimensional score rose 23% in five years, while Ha Nam’s dropped 15%. A promising new trend is seen in the north-western and Mekong south-western regions, with more provinces here emerging in the top group.

In light of these findings, it is recommended local authorities interact more with citizens through regular and ad-hoc direct meetings as chartered in their provincial decisions on meetings with citizens and constituents. The Law on Citizen Reception, effective from July 2014, provides the legal framework for better government-citizen interactions. Another recommendation is that the Viet Nam Fatherland Front, mass organizations and civil society should play a key role in reviewing the interaction mechanisms and finding ways to improve their effectiveness. To ensure more effective PIBs and CISBs these should be combined, better equipped with the appropriate skills, better resourced and actively engaged with citizens and civil society organizations.

**Control of Corruption in the Public Sector: Incentivize Citizen Reporting**

PAPI measures four aspects of citizen experiences with local government performance in controlling corruption: limits on public sector corruption, limits on corruption in public service delivery, equity in state employment and willingness to fight corruption. It also measures the tolerance of corruption practices by citizens.

As mentioned earlier, efforts to control corruption at the provincial level have had limited effects. That said, more than a third of provinces have improved their performance by at least 5% since 2011. Cao Bang improved by 33% and Tra Vinh improved by an impressive 47%. Tra Vinh was also the best performing province in 2015 thanks to the highest scores in the ‘limits on corruption in service delivery’ and ‘equity in state employment’ sub-dimensions. Nam Dinh was the best performer in terms of willingness to fight corruption from both local authorities and local citizens.

Looking across the country, central and southern provinces tend to do better on corruption control than northern ones. In 2015, among the top 16 best performers, 11 are southern provinces and four are from the central region. Long An and Soc Trang have been in the best performing group for five years in
a row. However, the greatest drop was witnessed in the southern province of Binh Duong, with its score falling by more than 30% compared to 2011. In the same period, Ha Noi has consistently remained in the poorest performing group.

Poorer performing provinces can learn from better performing ones about their experiences in ensuring greater equity in state employment and reducing bribery in public services. They can also learn important lessons on how to curb the abuse of public officials’ power to divert state funds and obtain informal payments in the provision of public administrative services and in state employment. Ensuring positive change also requires greater willingness by citizens to denounce corrupt acts. This kind of reporting can be facilitated by the participation of both non-governmental actors and the media, who can serve as channels for citizens to report corruption.

Public Administrative Procedures: Continue Reforms in Land Procedures

This dimension examines the quality of public administrative services in areas important to citizens, including certification services and application procedures for land use rights certificates, construction permits and personal documents. Citizens are asked about their experiences with using these public administrative services. The criteria include the transparency of procedures and fees, the competence and behaviour of civil servants, paperwork loads, deadlines and overall satisfaction with the public administrative services.

The performance of provinces has remained relatively stable over time in this area. Moreover, as compared to other dimensions measured by PAPI, this dimension has a smaller gap between the best (Bac Ninh) and the poorest (Quang Ngai) performing provinces. Although there is little difference between the groups, Da Nang, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh and Nam Dinh have been in the best performing group since 2011, while only Soc Trang has been in the poorest performing group for five consecutive years. Over the five-year period, just six provinces made significant improvements, with the most change happening in Can Tho whose dimensional score increased by about 16% compared to the 2011 benchmark.

Among the four public administrative services measured, the quality of the administrative service to obtain land use rights certificates has since 2011 been scored the lowest and has even declined significantly compared with previous years. Although the quality of certification services also declined slightly, these services still performed much better than services for construction permits and land use rights certificates. On the other hand, the application procedures for personal documents handled by commune-level People’s Committees received the highest user satisfaction, with 96% of those who used the service reporting they had a good experience with it. However, commune-level one-stop shops for personal documents saw a slightly lower level of user satisfaction in 2015 compared to previous years.

It is clear from the findings that transparency in application fees and meeting deadlines are key attributes of higher user satisfaction with administrative services in general. Measures to increase citizen satisfaction with public administrative services therefore include relevant local government agencies displaying fees and charges at one-stop shops and notifying applicants of changes in deadlines. For commune-level administrative services, it is essential to improve the competence of commune officials handling the procedures for applicants.

For land title related services, it is important for provincial departments of environment and natural resources in all provinces to strengthen and supervise the functioning of district affiliates by almost every criterion in order to increase user satisfaction. By providing clear information about required procedures, increasing the transparency of fees and charges, simplifying paperwork requirements, providing a clear deadline of when final results are returned and performing the service within the promised deadline, this service will improve. All these suggestions are also covered in the 2013 Land Law and its by-laws, which relevant local government agencies have to implement.
Quality of Public Service Delivery: Ensure Coverage for All

The quality of public service delivery is examined in PAPI through four key public services: public health care, public primary education, basic infrastructure and residential law and order. Citizens are asked about their experiences with the accessibility, quality and availability of basic public services in their communes, districts and provinces.

Findings from the 2015 PAPI survey confirm the stable trend in provincial performance in public service delivery over the past five years. The gap between the best performing province (Vinh Long) and the poorest performing (Dak Nong) is the narrowest among the six dimensions. This shows a convergence of provinces towards a relatively similar level. Among the public services assessed, basic infrastructure (electricity, roads, clean water and garbage collection) improved slightly, while public primary education and law and order remained consistent and public health care experienced a decline in user satisfaction. In health care, there was also a greater gap between the best and poorest performing provinces in terms of the quality of public district hospitals.

Over the past five years, better service delivery performers have tended to be concentrated in the south. The five provinces of Vinh Long, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, Kien Giang and Ba Ria-Vung Tau have been in the best performing group since 2011. Meanwhile, Binh Phuoc and Dak Nong have been in the poorest performing group for five consecutive years. On the whole, none of the provinces have fallen behind dramatically over the past five years. In the same period, there has been some improvement in 28 provinces. The most impressive improvers are Ha Giang, Hung Yen and Ninh Binh, with increases of more than 15% compared with their 2011 baselines.

It is worth highlighting the findings on basic infrastructure provided by local governments since, as mentioned above, this area (in particular roads) was cited as a top concern among respondents. The findings show that mountainous provinces need to overcome unfavourable conditions in order to catch up with lowland provinces. Across the country, about 97% of households had access to electricity in 2015. However, in the north-western province of Lai Chau only 58% reported access to national gridlines. The northern mountainous province of Ha Giang was at the bottom of the list on quality of roads. In the Central Highlands province of Gia Lai only 2% have access to clean water, while in the central coastal province of Da Nang almost every household has access to clean water.

Although citizens assess that the provision of public services and basic infrastructure is stable, it is important for provinces to continue improving these services. Better public services, in particular health and education, will contribute to better human resources that can foster innovation and creativity. Moreover, better infrastructure and law and order will help boost productivity and efficiency. Poorer provinces, especially those in the northwest and Central Highlands regions, need to invest more in basic public services, such as public hospitals, schools, roads and basic infrastructure, so that more equitable opportunities are created and their citizens are able to catch up with citizens in other provinces. This will help to unleash local potential and lead to sustainable development.
INTRODUCTION

On the eve of 2016 National Assembly and People’s Councils elections, this report on the 2015 Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) takes a five-year retrospective look at the governance and public administration reforms the current administration set out to achieve, from a citizen’s perspective. While positive changes are noted in some provinces in 2011-2015, much more needs to be done to accelerate progress in governance across the country in 2016-2021. To this end, the 2015 PAPI Report offers the coming administration a benchmark for future performance. The report also captures what the public has to say about policy issues that concern them. Citizen perspectives on these issues will serve to inform the Politburo, Government, National Assembly and People’s Councils, as well as other actors, in developing effective national and local policies for a more democratic and equitable Viet Nam in the next term.

Viet Nam has consolidated its position as a lower middle income country since reaching this status in 2010. Income per capita increased from USD1,336 in 2010 to USD2,052 in 2014, and annual economic growth has accelerated and was expected to average 6.5% in 2015.¹ Viet Nam’s score in the Human Development Index also improved, although at a slower rate, placing Viet Nam 116th out of 188 countries.² The more wealthy, educated and healthy citizens become, the more demanding they are of government. Along with rising expectations of a more prosperous life, Vietnamese citizens therefore also expect better governance, public administration performance and service delivery from the State. Such expectations are in line with Viet Nam’s 2013 Constitution, which says that “the State is of the people, by the people and for the people.”

Indeed, as the PAPI 2015 Report reveals, what Vietnamese people care most about are economic issues, including jobs and poverty, infrastructure such as roads, and governance matters like corruption and law and order. As highlighted in the pages that follow, these areas need stronger policy interventions and concrete actions from the party as well as central, provincial and local governments in order to realize the country’s development goals.

At the same time, PAPI 2015 shows that voter participation is low and only a small part of the population has a say in the development of laws and ordinances that govern people’s day-to-day lives. New policies cannot reflect the actual views and needs of society – or be assured of local implementation in practice – without the participation of both women

and men, Kinh and non-Kinh citizens, party and non-party members, and young and old people, who broadly represent the population.

While the PAPI 2015 Report finds that the vast majority of citizens are disengaged from the political process, this should not be taken as a lack of interest in public issues. To build more transparent, accountable and responsive institutions in Viet Nam, it is imperative to broaden the room for civil society, media and public involvement and to facilitate greater government-citizen engagement to achieve much-needed reforms.

The PAPI index is one of several external time-series data sources and policy monitoring tools used by policymakers in Viet Nam. PAPI measures governance and the public administration performance of governments at different levels from the perspective of citizens. It aims to improve the performance of local authorities to meet their citizens’ needs in two ways. First, it creates constructive competition and promotes learning among local authorities. Second, it enables citizens to benchmark local government performance and advocate for improvement. PAPI complements the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) by the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which measures businesses’ experiences with provincial economic governance, and the Public Administration Reform Index (known as the PAR Index) by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Together, these tools help policymakers and practitioners triangulate government-business-citizen assessments of policy implementation so as to inform subsequent institutional and policy reforms.

PAPI information and data has been used extensively by a number of important policy actors. For example, in the lead-up to the 2016 Viet Nam Communist Party Congress, the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics (HCMA) featured dedicated sessions on PAPI in its senior leadership courses. As a result, over half of key provincial party and government leaders in the 2016-2021 term have been informed of PAPI. The National Assembly Centre for Information has routinely requested PAPI reports for the use of National Assembly delegates. The Government Inspectorate uses PAPI findings on corruption in its annual reports to the National Assembly sessions. In 2015, PAPI was also used as the basis for an e-learning course to access information and develop action plans for women candidates who wish to become National Assembly delegates or People’s Council members.5 Finally, PAPI has been highlighted by UNDP as one of five global initiatives in citizen engagement that can be used to bolster governance and improve government performance.4

The 2015 PAPI survey was conducted and finished before the 12th Party Congress, which took place at the end of January 2016. During the course of the fieldwork, a number of important legislative documents that address the need to respect citizens’ rights became effective, were passed for issuance or were in the pipeline. Among them, the Law on Local Government Organization became effective and the Law on Referendums was passed. The Criminal Code and Civil Procedural Code were revised, addressing corruption crimes. A new draft Law on Associations and a draft Law on Access to Information were also proposed and discussed. Furthermore, the Communist Party recently called for strengthened anti-corruption policies and enhanced citizen rights, with the Viet Nam Fatherland Front emphasizing the importance of gathering social feedback and facilitating citizen monitoring of public agencies’ performance. Related to this, in 2016 the Anti-Corruption Law will be revised, after a decade of implementation. New regulations on involving communities in the supervision of public investments were also established in September 2015.5

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3 Available at www.sansangdethanhcong.com.
4 See UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence (2016).
5 Government Decree No. 84/ND-CP to monitor public investment projects from 30 September 2015.
In addition, the Government reached the midpoint in the implementation of the 2011-2020 Public Administration Reform Master Programme, which aims to significantly improve service delivery, citizens’ satisfaction with administrative procedures and human resources, and clarify the roles and responsibilities of administrative agents. More importantly, in the second phase of the master programme from 2016-2020, the state apparatus will be streamlined and reshuffled to make it smaller while providing better services.6

These new policies will be implemented across all 63 provinces and present both challenges and opportunities for local governments in the 2016-2021 term. The challenges are that with more constrained state resources, the new local governments will still have to gain and maintain citizens’ trust and confidence, deliver on the expectations of the central government as well as citizens, fulfil socio-economic development plans and contribute to the country’s overall development agenda. The opportunities are that local governments are able to make use of available resources from citizens and civil society in the betterment of governance and public administration performance. Citizens and civil society organizations can provide oversight of the public administration system, thereby helping to reduce corruption and mismanagement, and can support local governments to improve their performance by exercising their rights and obligations in policymaking and implementation.

This report on the 2015 PAPI survey findings is meant to provide a useful baseline for the new administration to use as a mirror of its performance. The report builds on the nationwide survey data and is structured in a similar way as previous PAPI reports, enabling easy tracking of changes in findings over time at the national and provincial levels. The first chapter charts changes in the overall national performance of governance and public administration from 2011-2015. The second chapter takes a close look at civic knowledge, citizen access to information and participation in governance. Chapter 3 presents aggregated and disaggregated findings for provinces, with time series comparisons at dimensional, sub-dimensional and indicator levels. The chapter closes with an overview of the relationship between PAPI and the Provincial Competitiveness Index as well as GDP per capita at the provincial level. Recommendations are an integral part of each chapter with a view to suggesting policy options and actions for relevant stakeholders to take into consideration.

The report is accompanied by the website www.papi.org.vn, which includes up-to-date and detailed documentation on provincial profiles, case studies and policy responses.

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6 Decision No. 2218/QĐ-TTg of the Prime Minister on Action Plan to implement Resolution No. 39-NQ/TW of 17 April 2015 of the Politburo on cutting state-funded staff and reorganizing state personnel (public officials, public employees and civil servants).
Introduction

This chapter details key national trends from the 2015 survey. Public service delivery scores continued to increase modestly. However, compared with previous years, 2015 witnessed a drop in scores for five out of the six dimensions of governance and public administration performance captured by PAPI. In particular, scores in the transparency and control of corruption dimensions dropped substantially.

The 2015 survey features a new question on the issues of greatest concern to citizens. Ahead of the 2016 election, it is important to understand what issues are on the minds of citizens. The results show that citizens are most interested in personal economic issues such as poverty, employment and income. Roads, which are essential for transport and commerce, were also deemed an important issue. In addition, corruption and law and order were of great concern. Despite wide media attention, the East Sea dispute was not the most important issue for many citizens.

A series of questions looking at land issues revealed that the overall number of land seizures remained relatively low, as compared to 2011-2013. However, there is a disparity between ethnic minority and ethnic majority respondents on land issues. While ethnic minorities were no more likely than the Kinh majority to report having land seized, minorities were much more likely to consider land to be a serious issue. A deeper look into the data shows that ethnic minorities were much more likely to report receiving no compensation for land seizures compared to ethnic Kinh. The reasons for this disparity are unclear and warrant further examination.

In anticipation of the revised Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents taking force in 2016, a range of new questions addressed citizen participation in law-making. One of the stipulations of the law is that citizens may be consulted during a law-making process. The results show that only an estimated 13% of respondents reported that their local governments had asked them to participate in a discussion on a law or ordinance. Furthermore, those who were asked to participate were much more likely to be party members, members of mass organizations or have higher levels of education. It will be interesting to track in the 2016 survey whether or not the new law will impact these results.

Finally, this chapter also zooms in on the question of corruption. Unfortunately, as shown in the national level indicators, control of corruption did not appear to experience any improvement in 2015. In fact, in a number of indicators, such as bribes in primary education and bribes for land use rights certificates, scores actually appeared worse than before.

This chapter will explore each of these issues in more detail before concluding with some broad policy recommendations.
National Trends Over Time

PAPI has now been implemented nationwide for five consecutive years. The year 2015 witnessed declines across almost all the dimensions, as compared to previous years (Figure 1.1). In particular, scores for control of corruption and for transparency declined the most. The control of corruption index fell by 3% while the transparency index plunged more than 7%. The one bright spot was public service delivery, where the scores continued their modest increase. As Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show, all dimensions, except for public service delivery, experienced significant declines.

Figure 1.1: PAPI Mean Scores by Dimensions from 2011-2015
Figure 1.2: Change in Mean Scores by Dimensions Over Time

Figure 1.3: Changes in Dimension Scores from 2012-2015
The changes in scores beg the question of why. Peering within the sub-dimensions provides some clues. Starting with the participation dimension, Figure 1.4 shows that most of the decline in this dimension is a continuation of declines from previous years. In particular, the sub-dimension on opportunities for participation continued its decline from 2011. As noted in the 2014 PAPI Report, much of this decline is likely due to the fact that the latest round of National Assembly and People’s Council elections was four years ago, in 2011. With elections coming up in 2016, this indicator will be one to watch in the next PAPI report.

The other dimensions are more vexing. Looking at the transparency dimension, Figure 1.5 shows that all the sub-dimensions featured drops. The largest drops were in awareness of poverty lists and commune budgets. Figure 1.6 paints a similar picture for the corruption dimension. All the corruption indicators featured some level of decline, with limits on public sector corruption comprising the largest year-on-year decline.

Figure 1.4: Change in Participation Scores from 2011-2015
Figure 1.5: Change in Transparency Scores from 2011-2015

Figure 1.6: Change in Control of Corruption Scores from 2011-2015
What explains the declines? One potential answer could be the change in how the PAPI survey was conducted in 2015. Appendix B discusses these changes in detail. The key issue is that fewer respondents participating in the 2015 survey had prior experience of taking part in it, compared to 2014.7 This could, for instance, have an effect on results in the transparency dimension. Respondents who have previously taken the survey might see it as a source of information that encourages citizens to press officials for further information on the budget or land development plans, leading to overall improvements in their assessment of transparency the following year. Therefore, with fewer respondents in the 2015 survey who had previously participated in it, transparency was rated poorer in 2015 compared to earlier years (see Figure B).

Citizen Satisfaction with Household Economic Situation

One of the Government’s main goals is to improve the economic well-being of the country and its citizens. As such, the survey asks citizens whether or not they are satisfied with their current economic situation, whether it has improved and whether they expect it to improve in the future. Despite the fluctuations in the Vietnamese economy, answers to these questions show remarkable stability from one year to the next. In 2015, as Figure 1.7 shows, slightly more individuals thought their situation was worse than five years ago and slightly fewer thought it the same. However, the number of people saying that their situation has improved remains stable at about 60%. Furthermore, more than 80% continue to rate their current economic situation as normal or very good as opposed to poor. Again, these numbers are consistent with previous years.

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7 These figures are derived using the design weights. The raw numbers are about 18% of respondents in 2014 who had taken the survey before, compared with 15% in 2015.
Most Important Issues Facing the Country in 2015

The 2015 survey featured a new question where respondents were asked an open-ended question on what they thought were the three most important issues facing the country. Figure 1.8 shows that poverty was identified as by far the most important issue facing Viet Nam. Jobs and employment, roads, corruption and law and order were also seen as important. Interestingly, the East Sea dispute, which garners so much attention in the media, was cited as the most important issue by only 5% of the population, compared with 18% for poverty and hunger. This suggests that while the East Sea dispute is certainly salient for many respondents, economic issues prevail.

Figure 1.9 shows that not only is poverty important nationally, but it is also important relatively evenly across all provinces. Only in the Red River Delta was it not the top issue. Furthermore, perhaps not surprisingly, it was extremely important in the rural, mountainous regions of the northwest and the Central Highlands. Figure 1.9 also shows interesting variation in the salience of the East Sea dispute, with the issue apparently more important in the southern parts of the country. It is particularly relevant in the South Central Coastal region, which is perhaps due to the importance of fishing in the region or the fact that the islands are officially part of provinces in the South Central Coastal region. Figure 1.10 breaks the issues down by rural and urban areas. Poverty and roads are much more important in rural areas, while education and public services are more important in urban areas. Interestingly, the East Sea dispute is much more important to urban respondents (with 6% stating it is their top concern) compared to rural respondents.

Figure 1.8: Most Important Issues in 2015
Figure 1.9: Most Important Issues in 2015 by Region

Northwest

Northeast

Red River Delta

North Central

South Central

Central Highlands

Southeast

Mekong Delta

Poverty/Hunger

Jobs/Employment

Other Social Issue

Roads

Education

Income

Environment

Corruption

Econ Growth/GDP

Bank Loans/Credit

Health/Insurance

Law and Order

East Sea Dispute

Mentioning the Issue

Top Issue
In terms of demographic variation on issues of interest, the most important factor explaining differences of opinion is gender. Female respondents in general were more interested in economic issues and public service delivery. Similar differences in priorities based on gender have been found in other countries, such as India. As Figure 1.11 shows, women were about 8% more likely than men to cite poverty as an important issue. Women were also about 5% more likely to cite education as a top concern. Issues that concerned men more than women were the East Sea dispute, corruption and roads. Men were 10% more likely to cite the East Sea as a concern than women, 6% more likely to find corruption a problem, and 4% more likely to see roads as problematic. On other issues, such as law and order, land and health, the gender gap was not significant.

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*See Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo (2004).*
**Figure 1.11: Importance of Selected Issues by Gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Difference between Men and Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Sea</td>
<td>10.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>-3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>-8.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Land Transparency, Compensation and Impact of Land Seizures**

Since the revised Land Law was passed in 2013, the PAPI survey has included a series of questions on citizens’ satisfaction with their compensation for land seizures. These questions are included because land is such a salient issue in the countryside and at high levels of government. As Figure 1.12 shows, 2015 witnessed a slight increase in the number of respondents reporting they had land taken as compared to 2014. However, this is still a decrease from previous years.

9 For an evaluation of the 2013 Land Law, see World Bank (2014).
In terms of compensation, as Figure 1.13 shows, the majority of those reporting that their households had land seized said they received monetary compensation. However, the number of respondents reporting no compensation increased from almost 24% to 27.5%. As with the 2014 findings, there is no clear explanation for why land is being taken without compensation. One potential answer is that only a small portion of the respondent’s land was taken, and therefore no compensation was provided. The other possibility is that the families in question had no land use rights certificate, even though they might have used the land for a long time.

Further analysis shows that land impacts different groups in varying ways (Figure 1.15). Not surprisingly, those who find land to be an important issue are more likely to have land taken. What is more striking is that the difference is greater between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority Kinh. In particular, minority respondents losing land were more likely to report land as a serious issue facing the country. While only about 6% – ethnic minority or not – who did not lose land said land was an important issue, the numbers increased to 8% for Kinh respondents who lost land and 13% for minority respondents who lost land.

In terms of satisfaction with compensation, the responses indicated low levels of satisfaction (Figure 1.14). Just under one third of respondents who had their land taken in the past year said they received fair compensation in 2015. The number rose to about half for those who knew friends or villagers who had land taken.
Figure 1.13: Types of Compensation Received

Figure 1.14: Fair Compensation
What this suggests is that land is a particularly important concern for minorities when they lose land. The difference is not that minorities lose land more often than Kinh majority respondents. While 7.5% of Kinh majority respondents reported losing land, only 6.9% of minorities did. However, minorities are far more likely to have land taken without compensation than ethnic Kinh. More than 26% of minority respondents that lost land said they received no compensation as compared with only 15% of ethnic Kinh respondents.

As suggested above, it is not yet clear why some respondents are not receiving compensation. One possibility is that ethnic minority respondents do not have official land use rights certificates. This question will be explored more fully in the 2016 PAPI survey.

**Participation in Decision-Making**

In July 2016 the revised Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents, which was passed in June 2015, will take effect. The law requires that for laws passed by the National Assembly, relevant agencies must post the draft laws online for at least 30 days. The same general process holds for government decrees, People’s Council resolutions and People’s Committee decrees. Furthermore, the drafting agencies may also choose to hold public meetings and publicize the drafts in the media if they wish. However, they are not required to. What this means is that local governments have wide discretion in who to involve in contributing opinions and how much they choose to mobilize them.

To provide a baseline for assessing the impact of the revised law, the 2015 survey asked several questions about citizens’ participation in the drafting of different legal documents. In particular, it asked whether citizens believed that the government was required to make laws public before voting on them. More than 86% of respondents reported that the government was required to do so. However, while citizens were aware that the government was required to publicize draft laws, only 13% reported that their local government had asked them to participate in a meeting on a draft government regulation. Of those who participated, citizens mentioned a range of laws and issues that they had commented on, including the Constitution, the Land Law (both effective from mid 2014) and revisions to the Criminal Code. Table 1.1 lists the legal documents or issues citizens most often provided input on.
Further analysis shows that individual factors determine who participates in consultations on legislation. In particular, mass organization membership matters. Members of the party and mass organizations are much more likely to be consulted by the local government. As Table 1.2 shows, the probability of being contacted by the local government is based heavily on organization membership and education level. Party members with a high school degree or more had a 35% probability of being asked to contribute to a law. Party members without a degree had only an 18% chance. Educated mass organization members had a 9.5% chance of being asked to participate, while those without a degree had only a 3% probability. Finally, respondents that were not affiliated with any organization had a less than 3% chance of being asked to participate in a consultative meeting on a draft regulation if they had a degree and a less than 1% probability if they did not.

What this suggests is that participation in law-making is very uneven. There are two possible explanations as to why this is the case. One is that local governments choose to consult citizens that are active in mass organizations to a much greater degree than citizens who are not members of any organization. Another is that members of mass organizations and the party are more informed, and thus press for inclusion in consultations on draft legislation. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that those who do not have an advanced degree are either rarely asked to participate or choose not to. Figure 1.16 provides some additional clues about the uneven participation in law-making. Most individuals were contacted through commune People’s Committee officials or mass organizations. It will be interesting to see whether in 2016, when the revised Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents comes into effect, these numbers change. This issue is also discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

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Table 1.1: Citizens’ Participation in Legislation Consultations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law or Issue</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Law</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal/Civil Code</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Directives</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Reform</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Consulted</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Probability of Being Consulted by Local Government for Opinions on Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Affiliation</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
<th>Probability of Consultation</th>
<th>Confidence Interval (95%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Member</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>25.7% to 45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Member</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>10.6% to 27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Organization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>6.8% to 12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Organization</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5,167</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.3% to 4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Affiliation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>1.3% to 4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Affiliation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3,936</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.3% to 1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10 Some of the respondents participated in more than one meeting, which is why the totals for each meeting add up to more than 1,008.

11 The probabilities are derived from a regression using the following control variables: poverty status, ethnicity, experience with the PAPI survey, whether the respondent was in a newly selected village or not, gender and age.
In terms of the efficacy of the participation, those who did participate were satisfied with their experience. The 2015 PAPI survey results show that more than 61% of those who were consulted submitted a comment. Most of the comments were made in consultative meetings held by commune People’s Committees. Although most did not receive a response from the government, more than half thought the final regulation reflected their input. Furthermore, those who participated thought that they should continue to be consulted and that the concerned government agencies could respond better to their input.

**Corruption Practices in the Public Sector**

Corruption continues to be an important issue in Viet Nam, particularly for residents in urban areas. More than 9% of urban respondents thought it was the most important issue facing the country (see Figure 1.10). At the same time, as Figure 1.2 shows, the control of corruption dimension of PAPI featured one of the sharpest drops at the national level, with the overall score falling more than 3%. The decline seems consistent across all the sub-indicators, with respondents more pessimistic about control of corruption in the public sector, public service delivery, employment opportunities and the Government’s willingness to control corruption. This section looks at the specific factors behind this drop.

Figure 1.17 shows that in all areas, respondents were more likely to either completely agree or somewhat agree that corruption is a problem. The sharpest increase concerned the question about public school teachers exhibiting favouritism towards students whose parents provide informal payments. In public health-care services, bribery has been consistently popular as perceived by more than 40% of the respondents.
There is also a noticeable spike in bribes paid for land use rights certificates. This finding is echoed in a survey experiment. Using a sophisticated but easy-to-answer set of questions to ask about experiences with bribery in obtaining land use rights certificates and services at public district hospitals and primary schools, the survey asked one group of respondents if they had participated in three non-sensitive and legal activities (paying an application fee, having legal documents certified and paying land surveying fees to obtain a land use rights certificate). For the other half, it asked the respondents if they participated in those same three activities in addition to paying a bribe. The difference in the average number of activities between the two groups provides an estimate of the percentage of citizens being forced to engage in bribery in those areas. Table 1.3 shows that the estimated frequency of paying bribes for obtaining land use rights certificates increased to more than 44% of respondents in 2015, up from 24% in 2014. In contrast, the number of respondents reporting they paid bribes for health-care services held steady at 12%.
In terms of whether citizens thought their local governments were serious about curtailing corruption, Figure 1.18 shows that about 37% of respondents perceived that their local governments were serious about anti-corruption, down from 39% in 2014. As in previous years, those who were aware of the Anti-Corruption Law were more likely to see their local governments as serious than those unfamiliar with it.

In sum, despite efforts to control corruption as reported by central and local governments in 2015, citizens continue to perceive and experience corruption as an endemic problem within local governments and a systemic practice in everyday government-citizen dealings.

Table 1.3: Estimated Frequency of Bribes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis Technique</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land Use Rights Certificates</th>
<th>Public District Health Care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency estimated from size (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Reports the share of respondents in the treatment group who answered that they paid more for items than those in the control group.

Finally, in terms of whether citizens thought their local governments were serious about curtailing corruption, Figure 1.18 shows that about 37% of respondents perceived that their local governments were serious about anti-corruption, down from 39% in 2014. As in previous years, those who were aware of the Anti-Corruption Law were more likely to see their local governments as serious than those unfamiliar with it.

In sum, despite efforts to control corruption as reported by central and local governments in 2015, citizens continue to perceive and experience corruption as an endemic problem within local governments and a systemic practice in everyday government-citizen dealings.
Conclusions and Policy Implications

The 2015 national level indicators show several trends that warrant concern. Ahead of the Party Congress and the national elections in 2016, it appears that citizen experiences with transparency and control of corruption have suffered. There has also been a constant decline in citizen participation at local levels, although this could simply be the result of the distance from the most recent round of elections. It will be important to see whether or not participation improves during the 2016 election year. However, if the next survey witnesses the same effect, this will signal an important problem demanding attention.

On the issue of corruption, the re-centralization of anti-corruption efforts by the Politburo, evident in the fact that the Party General Secretary is now the chairperson of the National Steering Committee on Anti-corruption, shows that the issue commands the attention of central level officials. However, the declining trend in the control of corruption dimension shows that increased attention to this area has not led to improved public perceptions of and experience with everyday corruption. This suggests that new and effective anti-corruption action plans are needed, in addition to the willingness to curb corruption from public officials and civil servants at all government levels.

In terms of good news, land seizures remained at low levels, suggesting that the 2013 Land Law may have had a lasting effect in tightening procedures.

At the same time, more work needs to be done to ensure that all citizens are able to enjoy their land-use related rights. In particular, research is necessary on why ethnic minorities report receiving lower levels of compensation or no compensation at all for land seized.

On the issues of greatest importance to the country, the survey showed that economic issues dominate in the minds of the public. However, the results also showed that men and women differ on the issues they find important. While women were more likely to find personal economic conditions and public services important, men were more likely to focus on corruption, transportation and foreign affairs. Of course, neither of these perspectives is inherently more valuable than the other, but the results do point to the importance of gender equality in terms of soliciting the opinions and common concerns of citizens.

This leads to the issue of participation in law-making. On this count, low numbers of citizens report being asked to participate in the drafting of ordinances and laws. Furthermore, these numbers are skewed in favour of party members, members of mass organizations and educated citizens. Men are also slightly more likely to be asked to participate. If, as the survey suggests, men and women have different priorities, then these differences in who is asked to participate are important and more should be done to equalize who is asked to participate in law-making processes.
Introduction

As Viet Nam prepares for its 2016 National Assembly election, this chapter examines in detail the factors that determine citizen participation in voting and in contributing opinions on laws. As the previous chapter shows, different citizens have different interests, views and experiences. Therefore, encouraging participation from a demographically representative group of citizens is essential to ensure that the feedback the Government hears is representative of the country. Following research from other countries, the analysis here looks at how factors that have been shown to drive participation elsewhere, such as gender, education and mass organization membership, impact participation in Viet Nam. Furthermore, the question of whether or not these factors have a direct impact on participation or whether they have an indirect effect through political knowledge or access to information is examined.

The analysis provides an assessment of a comment expressed by some local officials that participation is low because citizens do not care about politics. The PAPI survey results show that gender, ethnicity, political knowledge and education directly impact political participation in terms of voting. Political knowledge and access to information also play a role, lending credence to the argument that politically uninterested citizens are less likely to participate.

However, in terms of participation in legislative drafting processes, the situation is different. Gender, ethnicity, political knowledge and education play a much smaller role. Rather, party membership is by far the largest predictor of whether or not an individual is asked to participate to offer opinions on draft laws or ordinances. This suggests that a number of citizens that might be able and willing to contribute meaningfully to law-making are disengaged from the process.

The chapter concludes with some policy recommendations based on the analysis. The challenge of how to increase political participation is clearly a multifaceted problem. For elections, mobilizing more women and minorities to vote and increasing their awareness and interest in politics is important. For other forms of participation, such as providing opinions on legislation, the situation is somewhat different. Here, including citizens outside local political networks is important. The PAPI survey does not make it immediately clear why participants in consultations on draft legislation tend to be party members. One possibility is that consultation meetings on laws are either not publicized widely to otherwise politically interested individuals or the meetings take place at times that are inconvenient for non-party members. Clearly, greater efforts could be made to reach out to include a broader representation of society.

Political Participation

What is political participation? A report published by UNDP and Oxfam in 2015 usefully groups participation...
Table 2.1: Patterns of Participation in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voted in Village Election</th>
<th>Commented on Draft Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinh</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Member</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Party Member</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Organization Member</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Mass Organization Member</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Poor</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Holder</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Degree Holder</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results are consistent with Wells-Dang et al. (2015). Men, ethnic Kinh, civil society members, non-poor and educated citizens are more likely to engage in direct and indirect political participation. Further analysis of the data in Table 2.1 also reveals that the type of organization the respondent is a member of matters. In particular, party members are far more likely to participate in village elections and comment on draft laws than any other subgroup. Indeed, membership in a mass organization other than the party appears to have almost no impact on offering an opinion on a law.

While these figures are intriguing, several questions remain unanswered before any policy recommendation can be offered. First, it is unclear from just looking at this table which factors matter for participation. For example, in explaining the large number of party members that participate, one must recognize that party members differ from non-party members in a number of ways. For example, according to the 2015 PAPI survey results, party members are more likely to have a degree (70%) than non-party members (19%); they are more likely to be male (72%) than female (45%); and they are less likely to be poor (2%) compared with non-party members (9%). For these reasons, without more sophisticated analysis, it is difficult to tell whether party membership or the factors that are correlated with party membership – education, gender and income – drive participation.

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13 See Andrew Wells-Dang, Le Kim Thai and Nguyen Tran Lam (2015).
14 See Rosenstone, Steven and John Mark Hansen (1993).
15 See Center for American Women and Politics (2015).
Second, it is important to know the channel through which these factors impact political participation. It could be that these factors have a direct impact. For example, regarding gender, it is possible that women are less likely to participate because there are fewer female local leaders to act as role models for political engagement. Indeed, village leaders in Vietnam are disproportionately male, making this a possibility. In terms of party and mass organization membership, it is similarly possible that these factors could have a direct impact if these organizations actively mobilize their members to vote. Indeed, field experiments have shown that social pressure and mobilization can increase turnout.

However, another possibility is that these factors have an indirect effect through political knowledge. Research from other countries shows that citizens who are not politically aware are far less likely to participate in elections than those who demonstrate basic political awareness. If women, minorities, less educated citizens and poorer respondents are less politically aware, it is possible that it is this political awareness, rather than demographic factors, that leads to decreased levels of political engagement.

Political knowledge is potentially important for at least two reasons. First, political knowledge provides people with awareness of when and how to vote or attend a meeting. In short, not knowing when an election occurs, the correct voting procedures or that citizens can comment on laws might lead someone who would otherwise be interested in participating to not do so. Second, a lack of knowledge may prevent a citizen from distinguishing between the alternatives. If a citizen is not aware of basic political facts, how can they understand the consequences of their vote or a piece of legislation? Without being able to perceive a difference, citizens may be less motivated to vote or provide a comment on a law.

Another issue to consider is that both political knowledge and participation could be impacted through the source of information a respondent relies on. Studies show that in some contexts turnout is impacted by whether or not respondents rely on newspapers, television or the Internet. One study shows that newer sources of media, such as cable television and the Internet, widen the knowledge gap between those who enjoy political news and those who do not. This is because greater choice allows those who are not interested in political news to avoid it entirely.

### Sources of Information

Because political knowledge and participation can be impacted by how respondents access information, citizens were asked what their primary source of information about national affairs and government was. Respondents could select from traditional sources such as newspapers and television, as well as more modern sources such as the Internet and mobile phones.

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of how respondents receive information. By far the most important source of information was television, with more than 84% of respondents saying they received political news from that source. Other traditional sources, such as radio, personal communication and public meetings, came in at about 30%. New media sources such as the Internet and mobile phones were less widespread, with less than 20% of respondents saying they received news from those sources. Finally, it is worth noting that about 4% of the respondents said they received no news whatsoever. Some of these respondents said that they had no interest or that they were too busy.

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16 See Beaman, Lori, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova (2012).
18 See Delli Carpini, Michael and Scott Keeter (1996).
Figure 2.1: Primary Source of Political Information

Probing deeper, there is a significant demographic component that impacts where citizens access their news. As Table 2.2 shows, men, ethnic majority Kinh, party members, non-poor and educated citizens were more likely to access information from all sources. Interestingly, members of mass organizations were more likely than non-members to access information from meetings (37% versus 23%) and slightly less likely to do so through newspapers (18%) and the Internet (15%) than non-mass organization members (20% for both).

The analysis of where people get political information from underscores two points. First, television remains the dominant source of political information for Vietnamese citizens. Second, access to information is linked to demographic factors such as education, gender, ethnicity and mass organization membership.

Table 2.2: How Respondents Access Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Source</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Kinh</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Party Members</th>
<th>Non-Party Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Source</th>
<th>Mass Organization Members</th>
<th>Non-Mass Organization Members</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Non-Poor</th>
<th>Degree Holders</th>
<th>Non-Degree Holders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 See Prior, Markus (2005).
Political Awareness

The next step in understanding the causes of political participation is to look at patterns of public knowledge. How do demographic factors and sources of information impact what citizens know? To assess levels of political awareness, the 2015 PAPI survey provides one of the first, nationally representative evaluations of political knowledge in Viet Nam. First, the survey asked whether or not respondents could correctly identify the country’s leadership. Second, it asked whether or not citizens knew when the Party Congress and National Assembly elections are held. Finally, it asked questions pertaining to election laws. In particular, citizens were asked whether proxy voting, where one person votes on behalf of another person, is legal (it is not) and whether precinct leaders can suggest candidates for elections (they cannot). A variety of questions were asked because surveys from other countries show that citizens are often more able to identify procedures than specific names or dates.20

Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of respondents that were able to correctly identify the leadership. It shows that the position of Prime Minister was most visible to the public, with nearly 57% of the respondents able to name the Prime Minister in office in 2015. The positions of Party General Secretary and State President were less visible, with about 43% of respondents able to identify the President and 28% the General Secretary. The National Assembly Chairperson is the least visible institution, with less than 22% of respondents able to correctly name the Chairman in office in 2015.

Figure 2.2: Respondents Correctly Identifying Top Leaders

Citizens were also asked whether they could correctly identify 2016 as the year for the national elections and the Party Congress. Figure 2.3 shows that only 14% of respondents could correctly identify 2016 as the year of the next National Assembly election, while 11% knew that 2016 is the year of the next Party Congress.

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Finally, to assess familiarity with elections procedures, the PAPI survey asked two questions related to respondents’ knowledge of the relevant electoral laws. The first question asked whether or not proxy voting is legal. The second question asked whether or not citizens are obligated to vote in a manner suggested by local officials. The numbers are striking. While more than half of citizens know that voting by proxy is illegal, less than 40% were aware that it is illegal for local officials to suggest candidates.

**Figure 2.3: Citizens’ Knowledge of Formal Election Procedures and Important Event Dates**

Looking at variations in political knowledge, Table 2.3 shows the probabilities that respondents will correctly answer the questions. Demographic factors play a large role in determining knowledge of specific dates and events. In particular, gender, ethnicity, education and party membership have a significant impact on whether or not respondents can identify their leaders or when major political events occur. Most dramatically, while men have a greater than 50% chance of correctly identifying their leaders, women are less than 25% likely to correctly answer the question. Men also have a 15% chance of correctly identifying upcoming political events as compared to 5% for women. Party membership and education are also critically important. The impact of demographic factors is less pronounced for identifying the correct election procedures, which suggests that awareness of election procedures is more even across the population.

In terms of access to information, perhaps not surprisingly, those who did not regularly access news were less able to correctly answer the civic knowledge questions. In terms of what type of information source was superior, it appears that television was the most informative in leading respondents to the correct answer. Interestingly, those who accessed information primarily through the Internet or

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21 This question was asked in two ways. The first asked whether proxy voting was illegal. The second asked whether proxy voting was legal. This was done to account for any potential confirmation bias effects.
newspapers were not more likely to correctly identify the leaders, know election laws or the dates of key events as compared to those who had no access to information. This holds even when holding constant the factors that make a person more likely to use the Internet, such as age. In contrast, those who watched television news were statistically more likely to correctly answer each of the questions.

One possible explanation for this is that citizens watching television – particularly those without cable – are more restricted in their ability to select what type of information they get. On the other hand, for newspapers and especially the Internet, citizens have greater control in terms of accessing the type of information they want. However, this explanation does not appear to explain the behaviour found here, as those with cable television are actually more likely to know the names of the top leaders and event dates than those who only have access to basic television. Another possibility is the market structure of the media. Given that television news has a smaller number of outlets, perhaps the competing news outlets do not compete as hard on “soft” entertainment news as newspapers and the Internet.22

Table 2.3: Impact of Demographics and Information on Political Knowledge23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Know Leaders</th>
<th>Know Election Laws</th>
<th>Know Event Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Predicted Percentage</td>
<td>Margin of Error (95%)</td>
<td>Predicted Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54% ± 5%</td>
<td>55% ± 5%</td>
<td>15% ± 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23% ± 4%</td>
<td>53% ± 5%</td>
<td>5% ± 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinh</td>
<td>38% ± 4%</td>
<td>54% ± 4%</td>
<td>9% ± 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>27% ± 10%</td>
<td>51% ± 8%</td>
<td>8% ± 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Member</td>
<td>57% ± 13%</td>
<td>65% ± 17%</td>
<td>34% ± 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Party Member</td>
<td>36% ± 4%</td>
<td>53% ± 4%</td>
<td>8% ± 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Org. Member</td>
<td>41% ± 5%</td>
<td>58% ± 5%</td>
<td>11% ± 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Mass Org. Member</td>
<td>33% ± 5%</td>
<td>50% ± 5%</td>
<td>7% ± 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>26% ± 11%</td>
<td>56% ± 11%</td>
<td>9% ± 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Poor</td>
<td>38% ± 4%</td>
<td>54% ± 4%</td>
<td>6% ± 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Holder</td>
<td>52% ± 10%</td>
<td>60% ± 7%</td>
<td>15% ± 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Degree Holder</td>
<td>33% ± 4%</td>
<td>52% ± 4%</td>
<td>8% ± 2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Source</th>
<th>Know Leaders</th>
<th>Know Election Laws</th>
<th>Know Event Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>23% ± 10%</td>
<td>44% ± 10%</td>
<td>4% ± 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>37% ± 5%</td>
<td>51% ± 6%</td>
<td>8% ± 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>33% ± 15%</td>
<td>48% ± 13%</td>
<td>7% ± 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>29% ± 12%</td>
<td>49% ± 15%</td>
<td>7% ± 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 The estimated effects are calculated from simulations based on a probit model controlling for the variables included in the table, as well as party membership, mass organization membership, ethnicity, whether living in a rural area, poverty and experience with previous PAPI surveys. The predicted effects shown above are the estimated percentages when all other variables are held at their national means.
Impact of Public Awareness on Participation

Putting all the pieces together, this section assesses the impact of the various factors described in Table 2.1. What factors matter for political participation and through which channels do they matter? The two forms of participation that this section looks at are shown in Table 2.1: voting in the last village election and participation in a meeting to offer comments on a draft law or ordinance.

Figure 2.4 shows the predicted impact of different factors on whether or not a respondent voted in a village election, holding all other conditions equal. It shows that some demographic characteristics have a direct impact on voting. Men, ethnic Kinh and mass organization members are more likely to vote than other groups. Strikingly, men are more than 10% more likely than women to vote, even holding political knowledge, information sources and other factors constant. This suggests that for reasons other than political awareness and access to information, women do not vote as often as men. One potential explanation, as indicated in research from India, is that perhaps women are not as motivated to participate because of a lack of political role models.24 A more mundane explanation is that in areas where one family votes on behalf of the entire family, men may take the responsibility.

Also striking from Figure 2.4 is that civic knowledge of election laws has a strong impact on whether or not a respondent votes. Those with high knowledge (who answered all three questions correctly) had about a 50% chance of voting. In contrast, those with low knowledge (who answered only one question correctly) only had a 30% likelihood of voting. In terms of source of information, those who watched television were more likely to vote, as compared to those who did not access any news. Interestingly, accessing news via the Internet did not have an independent effect on increasing participation. Boosting participation in elections, therefore, is tightly linked to levels of political awareness.

In terms of participation in law-making, Figure 2.5 tells a markedly different story. Here gender and ethnicity play no direct role in increasing participation. Similar to voting, education and political knowledge play a role. However, in contrast to voting, party membership is by far the main determinant of participation in consultative meetings on draft laws and regulations. Party members have a greater than 35% chance of participating in such consultative meetings. No other group – regardless of attribute – has a greater than 15% chance of participating.

This suggests that participation in law-making depends more on political networks. There are several possible reasons for this. Perhaps the meetings are not well publicized. Local officials may be less likely to contact those outside of the political network. It is also possible that citizens who are not part of the party do not have time to leave work to participate in a meeting that is held during the day. In any case, these results counter a common complaint by local officials that citizens do not participate because they do not care about local politics. As the new PAPI 2015 evidence reveals, in terms of participation in consultation meetings on draft legislation, a number of citizens who regularly access political information and have basic political knowledge are simply not included in law-making.25

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25 For an expression of this sentiment, see a quote from a local official in Wells-Dang et al. (2015, p.10).

32
Figure 2.4: Estimated Probability of Voting in Village Election

Demographics

- Party Member: 55%
- Non-Party Member: 40%
- Male: 25%
- Female: 32%
- Degree: 32%
- No Degree: 33%
- Kinh: 29%
- Minority: 40%
- Mass Org. Member: 26%
- Non-Mass Org. Member: 32%
- Poor: 32%
- Non-Poor: 32%

Information and Knowledge

- High Knowledge: 50%
- Low Knowledge: 32%
- Info TV: 30%
- Info Newspaper: 22%
- Info Internet: 21%
- Info None: 22%
Figure 2.5: Estimated Probability of Participating in Consultative Meetings on Draft Legislation

Demographics

Information and Knowledge

95% Confidence Interval
Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter assessed patterns of political participation, access to information and political knowledge. It looked at the relationship between the different factors to show how representative participation in Viet Nam is and identify potential solutions. The results paint two different pictures depending on the type of participation.

For voting, demographic factors such as gender, ethnicity and mass organization membership matter both directly as well as indirectly through political knowledge and engagement. This suggests two strategies to increase participation in voting. First, the barriers to voting should be removed for underrepresented individuals. To address this, Wells-Dang et al. (2015) provide some useful recommendations. These include cracking down on proxy voting, using domestic election monitors and increasing the diversity of local candidates. These factors could reduce the direct impact of gender and ethnicity in particular, by decreasing the extent to which men vote on behalf of the family and providing role models for political participation.

The 2015 PAPI results also suggest that a large number of Vietnamese citizens are politically disengaged. The problem is especially pronounced for women and less educated respondents. A second solution to increase participation in voting is therefore to increase the level of information citizens have about politics. Some potential ways to do this could involve distributing information in more easily digestible formats, as research findings by Bui et al. (2015) suggest. Another potential remedy would be to increase the length of time between when the ballots are announced and the election date so that citizens have a better chance to hear from candidates and know more about their opinions. Currently, voters only have about two weeks from when the final ballot is announced to the election date to gather information on candidates. In many cases citizens do not know any more about National Assembly candidates other than what is on their resumés. To engage more citizens politically, energizing the election process could be a useful solution.

On the issue of direct participation, the recommendations are different. Here, participation is primarily impacted by political membership. In short, a number of politically aware citizens do not participate in local meetings on draft laws or ordinances. This suggests that more needs to be done to encourage those with an interest in politics to participate. Some areas that could have an impact are how well the meetings are publicized and the time of day the meetings take place. Holding meetings during non-working hours or on weekends, for example, could improve attendance from those who are not part of local political networks.

Additionally, new ways could be developed to engage citizens. It appears from Chapter 1 that the primary channel through which citizens are engaged is the commune level People’s Committee. Perhaps other avenues could be developed. One strategy that has been used elsewhere to encourage participation, particularly in local budgeting, is to encourage a random selection of respondents to participate in drafting laws, local ordinances or even local budgets. The Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry has experimented with a similar strategy in terms of drafting business regulations with some positive results.

26 See Wells-Dang et al. (2015).
27 See Wampler, Brian (2007).
CHAPTER 2
CIVIC KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Introduction
This chapter details provincial performance trends at dimensional, sub-dimensional and indicator level over time. A five-year retrospective on what citizens have experienced during the 2011-2015 government term is useful, as it helps inform the next administration of what has worked and what has not in local governance and public administration reforms. Also, by looking into specific policy implementation issues, this chapter presents not only good and poor performers, but also good practices at provincial level that other provinces, especially those with similar socio-economic and geographic characteristics, can learn from and adapt within their localities.

The chapter is structured by PAPI dimension. In each dimension, findings will be presented in a map showing provincial performance in 2015 by grouping the 63 provinces into four quartiles. The navy colour represents the top 25% of provinces, green represents the second quarter, orange represents the third quarter and light yellow is used for the bottom quarter. For each dimension a table also shows concrete scores by dimension, sub-dimensions and indicators, as well as scores over time to allow for easy tracking of changes, in addition to mean, median and maximum scores and corresponding provinces. Graphs showing key results at the indicator level for the 2011-2015 period are also included in each section. The chapter concludes with showing aggregate unweighted 2015 PAPI scores by quartiles and an overview of the change from 2011-2015 by province. The last section also includes an overview of the correlations between the 2015 PAPI survey and the 2015 Provincial Competitiveness Index as well as 2014 GDP per capita.

It is important to reiterate that scores should be read as an opportunity to assess performance across a wide range of structural issues, and not as a critique or call to improve a particular score. What PAPI scores reflect are structural issues citizens encounter when experiencing provincial performance in governance and public administration. These scores act as mirrors of the overall performance, and provincial authorities should focus on identifying actionable measures to fix problematic areas. The ultimate objective of PAPI is to provide national and provincial governments with the evidence they need to improve the reflection seen in the mirror. Any attempts to change PAPI scores without actual performance improvement will not help increase or sustain citizens' satisfaction with what they experience in the everyday performance of their local government. As PAPI findings over time have shown, provinces taking a comprehensive and systematic approach to improving their performance create benefits for both citizens and local governments.
**Dimension 1: Participation at Local Levels**

Participation in political, social and economic life is a Vietnamese citizen’s constitutional right, enshrined in the 2007 Grassroots Democracy Ordinance. Participation is important for citizens to exercise their democratic rights and do their part to help improve local governance. The PAPI dimension ‘Participation at Local Levels’ measures citizens’ knowledge of their participation rights and how they exercise them. Table 3.1 presents the indicators that are used to formulate this dimension.\(^29\)

**Overall Provincial Performance.** Findings from this dimension show that citizen participation at the local level remains limited in 2015 by almost every measure, with three out of four sub-dimensions (knowledge of participation, opportunities for participation and quality of village head elections) declining in scores compared to the 2011 baselines (Table 3.1). On a more encouraging note, citizen participation in decision-making on starting local infrastructure projects was higher in 2015, contributing to a higher sub-dimensional score in voluntary contributions to local infrastructure projects (Figure 3.1a4).

Interestingly, most of the best performing provinces in 2015 are in the north-eastern and central regions (see Map 3.1). This pattern has existed since 2011 and seems to have become even stronger in the north-central part of the country during the past five years. Thai Binh and Ha Tinh have been in the best performing group for four years in a row. The north-western province of Lai Chau has been in the poorest performing group since 2011.

There has been a significant downward trend in citizen participation in two thirds of the provinces from 2011-2015. Figure 3.1b shows that the largest drops are in Lang Son, Son La, Lai Chau and Ba Ria-Vung Tau, where provincial dimensional scores have dropped by at least 25 percentage points over the last five years.

**Civic Knowledge.** The sub-dimension on civic knowledge looks at what citizens know about their political and civic rights. Compared to 2011, there has been a continued decline in scores in this sub-dimension at the national level (Table 3.1). This is caused mainly by the fact that fewer citizens know which public office positions are elected and which are not (Figure 3.1a2). Another reason is that fewer citizens were aware of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance and the term in office of their village heads in 2015 than before (Figure 3.1a1). Ha Tinh is the province where the civic knowledge of respondents was highest, but at a modest score of 1.48 points on a scale from 0.25-2.5 points. Ha Giang fell far behind, with a 2015 score of 0.62 points.

**Opportunities for Participation.** This sub-dimension highlights citizens’ experiences in participating in elections of representatives to the National Assembly, People’s Councils and in villages. It also points to how active local governments are in helping citizens exercise their rights to political participation. Here, citizens are asked about whether they voted in the 2011 elections and most recent village head elections. The declining trend continues to be seen in the national mean score of this sub-dimension. For example, while in 2011 66% said they voted in the National Assembly elections, this fell to 31% in 2015 for the same elections. Apart from respondents’ fading memories of the 2011 National Assembly and People’s Councils elections, proxy voting (where one person votes on behalf of another person) is another reason that explains why respondents forgot about the 2011 elections, as depicted in Chapter 2 and research by Oxfam and UNDP (2015). Another explanation for the decline is that fewer citizens participated in village head elections in 2015 than before (Figure 3.1a3). The formalistic nature of village head elections may have discouraged citizens from active participation in selecting their grassroots representatives.

**Quality of Village Elections.** The quality of village elections is assessed by indicators measuring citizens’ free choice of candidates, the way the elections are conducted to ensure fair selection and transparency, and whether winners are properly announced to the public. As shown in Table 3.1, at the national level fewer respondents (52%) said they were invited to the most recent village head election compared to past years. Although the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance requires at least two candidates to choose from in village elections, fewer respondents confirmed this was the case in 2015. Competition was poorest in Ha Giang, where only 20% said there were two candidates to choose between. Candidates were also often suggested by the authorities and overall the elections do not seem to be competitive. In 2015, few respondents said candidates were not suggested, and as in previous years over 90% of respondents said they voted for the winner.

**Voluntary Contributions.** Voluntary, instead of forced, contributions to building and/or remodelling community infrastructure, such as cultural houses, roads or schools, is seen as a form of active citizen participation. Once citizens contribute voluntarily, they tend to participate more actively in different project processes, from initiating to overseeing roles. At the national level, in 2015 nearly 40% of respondents voluntarily contributed to a public project in their community in the form of cash, in-kind or labour. There has been some positive change in the aspect that spending of voluntary contributions was monitored by Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs) and/or People’s Inspection Boards (PIBs), with more respondents in 2015 reporting that they did some supervision compared to previous years’ findings. This may be attributed to the promotion of such mechanisms through the National Target Programme on New Rural Development being implemented across the country. However, only 16% of respondents reported that CISBs and/or PIBs carried out some form of supervision. Ha Tinh tops the country in this indicator, with half of respondents reporting that CISBs and PIBs provided supervision. In addition, more respondents said they took part in decision-making to start an infrastructure project (53.5%) and provided inputs for the design (32%) in 2015 than before.

**Recommendations.** Improving citizen participation in local governance would not require a large financial investment from the state budget. It, however, needs strong commitment from relevant state agencies and local governments to putting the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance into force and to engaging citizens in political life and policymaking. The 2016 National Assembly and People’s Council elections can be seen as a great opportunity for state agencies in charge of the elections to engage citizens more proactively so as to avoid proxy voting, while ensuring full compliance with state regulations on organizing elections and with the ‘one person, one vote’ rule.
Map 3.1: Provincial Performance in Participation by Quartiles in 2015

Participation at Local Levels

- **Best Performers**
- **High Average**
- **Low Average**
- **Poor Performers**
### Table 3.1: List of Indicators on Participation at Local Levels (Dimension 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>National Mean</th>
<th>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</th>
<th>Provincial PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Participation at Local Levels</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Dimension 1: Participation at Local Levels</strong></td>
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<td>Civic Knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opportunities for Participation</td>
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<td>Sub-Dimension 3: Quality of Elections</td>
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<td>Voluntary Contributions</td>
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<td>Awareness of “People Know, People Decide…” (%)</td>
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<td>Correct Limit of 2.5 Years (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voted in Last Commune People’s Council Election (%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table contains detailed data on various indicators related to participation at local levels, including civic knowledge, opportunities for participation, quality of elections, voluntary contributions, and awareness of grassroots democracy. Each indicator is measured on a scale and includes scores for different provinces.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</th>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>National Mean</th>
<th>National PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>PAPI 2015 (95% CI) Provincial PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S2. Opportunities for Participation</strong></td>
<td>Voted in last National Assembly Election (%)</td>
<td>d101d1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>65.94%</td>
<td>55.66%</td>
<td>48.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village Head Elected (%)</td>
<td>d103a</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>83.38%</td>
<td>85.57%</td>
<td>89.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in Village Head Election (%)</td>
<td>d107</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72.87%</td>
<td>71.32%</td>
<td>65.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S3. Quality of Elections</strong></td>
<td>More than one candidate (%)</td>
<td>d105</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>51.50%</td>
<td>52.27%</td>
<td>58.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invited to Participate (%)</td>
<td>d106</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>52.37%</td>
<td>51.38%</td>
<td>56.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paper Ballot was Used (%)</td>
<td>d107a</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>47.81%</td>
<td>44.24%</td>
<td>48.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes were Counted Publicly (%)</td>
<td>d107d</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>51.81%</td>
<td>52.37%</td>
<td>58.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Candidate was not Suggested (%)</td>
<td>d107b</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>47.81%</td>
<td>42.93%</td>
<td>48.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes for Winner</td>
<td>d107c</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>47.81%</td>
<td>42.93%</td>
<td>48.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</td>
<td>Name of Indicator</td>
<td>Survey Question</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>Provisonal PAPI 2015 Scores</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4. Voluntary Contributions</td>
<td>Voluntary Contribution to Project (%)</td>
<td>d109ba</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>47.90%</td>
<td>47.28%</td>
<td>44.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Monitoring Board, Monitors Contribution (%)</td>
<td>d109bb</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10.97%</td>
<td>8.56%</td>
<td>13.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary Contribution Recorded (%)</td>
<td>d109bc</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>69.94%</td>
<td>71.12%</td>
<td>75.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in Decision-Making to Start Project (%)</td>
<td>d109bd</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>34.42%</td>
<td>37.29%</td>
<td>45.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provided Input to Project Design (%)</td>
<td>d109be</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>21.91%</td>
<td>22.78%</td>
<td>27.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum; BRVT for Ba Ria-Vung Tau, HCMC for Ho Chi Minh City, TT-Hue for Thua Thien-Hue
Figure 3.1a: Trends in Key Indicators in Dimension 1

Figure 3.1a1: Civic Knowledge Indicators

Figure 3.1a2: Knowledge of Which Post is Elected (a civic test of which post to be elected)

Figure 3.1a3: Citizen Participation in Elections (2011-2015)

Figure 3.1a4: Voluntary Contribution Indicators
Figure 3.1b: Changes in Performance in Participation
(\% - 2015 against 2011)

Note: Y = percentage of change in 2015 data from 2011 data, with a change of ±5\% defined as statistically significant.
Dimension 2: Transparency

PAPI measures citizens’ “rights to know” about state policies that affect their everyday life and livelihoods. Transparency in the three sub-dimensional areas ‘poverty lists,’ ‘commune budgets’ and ‘local land-use planning and pricing’ is the focus of the second dimension of PAPI. Information relating to the three sub-dimensions is required by the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance and recent legislation to be made publicly available in a transparent manner so citizens across the country can “know, discuss, do and verify.”

Overall Provincial Performance. As Map 3.2 shows, more northern and central provinces are found in the group of better performers than southern ones. There is also consistent performance across a number of provinces. For instance, Nam Dinh and Quang Tri have been in the best performing group for five consecutive years. Tuyen Quang has been in this group for three years in a row. Lai Chau, Bac Lieu and Kien Giang have been in the poorest performing group since 2011 and Khanh Hoa since 2012.

There are differences in the level of improvement in provincial performance in the 63 provinces over time from 2011-2015. Figure 3.2b shows that 11 provinces saw improvements of more than 5% in 2015 compared to 2011, while 17 provinces saw a significant decrease over time. The largest hike is seen in Phu Tho (+16%) while the steepest drops are seen in Ba Ria-Vung Tau and Son La (about -20%).

Transparency in Lists of Poor Households. This sub-dimension measures the share of citizens aware of the publication of lists of poor households in their commune during the year and reflects how citizens experience the quality of poor household listings. Findings from the 2015 survey show that the percentage of citizens who are aware of the publication of lists of poor households in their communes declined to 53% in 2015, after a slight increase for three years (Figure 3.2a1). Ha Tinh was seen as a place where poverty lists were made publically available in 2015, much better than the situation in Hai Phong. More than 46% of respondents nationwide believed that truly poor households were not included on the list in 2015, more than in previous years. This ranges from 72.5% in Khanh Hoa to 12% in Long An. At the same time, a larger percentage of respondents (nearly 41%) believed that non-poor households were included in local poverty lists, also higher than previously seen (Figure 3.2a1).

Transparency in Commune Budgets. Knowing how commune budgets are used is an important part of keeping local public officials under check and preventing diversion of public funds for private use. This sub-dimension reveals the level of transparency in commune budgets and expenditure, an important Grassroots Democracy Ordinance requirement that communes must comply with to ensure citizens’ “rights to know.” As Figure 3.2a2 shows, all three contributing indicators (that the commune budget and expenditure lists were made publicly available, that citizens could read the budget and expenditure lists and that citizens believe in the accuracy of these) witnessed declines in 2015 compared to the previous four years. Of the 26.5% of respondents nationwide who read the commune budget, about 64% trust the accuracy of the information. In Ho Chi Minh City nearly 60% of respondents had access to the commune budget and expenditure lists, and in Long An nearly 97% of those who read the budget and lists believe in the accuracy of the information.

Transparency of Local Land-Use Planning and Price Frames. Measuring transparency in land-use planning and pricing helps to encourage local governments to publicize land plans and land compensation schemes, in compliance with the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance. Findings from the 2015 survey show that there has been a regression in the publicity of local land-use plans since 2011, with the 2015 share of respondents nationwide aware of local land-use plans at about 12%. This might be because of the new regulations that land plans are now made at district and higher levels, according to the 2013 Land Law that has been effective since July 2014. However, commune People’s Committees are still mandated to publicize information about local land plans and any changes to these plans. In Ha Tinh, the best performer in this indicator, only about 37% of respondents were aware of local land plans.

Of those informed of local land plans nationwide, only a tiny share (about 3%) had the opportunity to comment on them. Figure 3.2a3 shows a downward trend for respondents’ comments to be acknowledged. The impact of local land plans has also been detrimental for respondents’ families and local villages over the past five years (Figure 3.2a4). Dien Bien citizens were happier with recent local land plans than citizens in other provinces (Table 3.2).

Recommendations. To improve transparency in a sustainable way, it is important for local governments to find and adapt various means of disclosing trustworthy information to citizens with different demographic backgrounds. This could be done through government portals at provincial and district levels, although as PAPI findings show only about 25% of respondents have Internet at home and very few (about 7%) go onto the Internet to search for information about land price frames. For rural and remote areas, notice boards at the commune level or loudspeakers at the village level would help disseminate information.
### Table 3.2: List of Indicators on Transparency (Dimension 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>National Mean</th>
<th>Provincial PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
<th>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Dimension 2: Transparency of Local Decision-Making</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Poverty Lists</td>
<td>Poverty List Published in Last 12 Months</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>Ninh Thuan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 1 Errors on Poverty List (% Disagree)</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 2 Errors on Poverty List (% Disagree)</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>Hai Duong</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-Dimension 1: Poverty Lists</strong></td>
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<td>1. Poverty Lists</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-Dimension 2: Land-Use Planning/Pricing</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sub-Dimension 3: Commune Budgets</strong></td>
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<td>1. Poverty Lists</td>
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**Note:** The table continues with similar entries for other indicators listed under the three sub-dimensions of Dimension 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</th>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>National Mean</th>
<th>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</th>
<th>Provincial PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>PAPI 2011</td>
<td>PAPI 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing</td>
<td>Aware of Local Land Plans (%)</td>
<td>d204</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19.61%</td>
<td>20.82%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Comment on Local Land Plans (%)</td>
<td>d205</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6.49%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
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<td>Land Plan Acknowledges Your Concerns (%)</td>
<td>d205a</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>82.65%</td>
<td>86.77%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of Land Plan on Your Family (3=Beneficial)</td>
<td>d206</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Did not Lose Land as a Result of Land Plan</td>
<td>d207</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>74.91%</td>
<td>76.21%</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Compensation Close to Market Value (%)</td>
<td>d207a(^), d207aa &amp; d207ba</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>17.96%</td>
<td>18.84%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Informed of Land Usage (%)</td>
<td>d207c</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>90.66%</td>
<td>92.89%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Use for Original Purpose (%)</td>
<td>d207d</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>82.64%</td>
<td>85.23%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Know Where to Go to Get Land Price Information (%)</td>
<td>d208</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>42.76%</td>
<td>49.85%</td>
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Note: (^) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum
Figure 3.2a: Trends in Key Indicators in Dimension 2

Figure 3.2a1: Transparency in Poor Household Listing

Figure 3.2a2: Transparency in Commune Budget and Expenditure

Figure 3.2a3: Transparency in Local Land Plans and Land Price Frame

Figure 3.2a4: Impact of Land Plan on Own Families/Villagers
(1=no impact; 2=hurt own family/villagers; 3=beneficial)
Figure 3.2b: Changes in Performance in Transparency

(\% - 2015 against 2011)

Note: Y = percentage of change in 2015 data from 2011 data, with a change of ±5\% defined as statistically significant.
Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability

The ‘Vertical Accountability’ dimension of the PAPI survey measures interactions with local authorities and the coverage and effectiveness of People’s Inspection Boards (PIBs) and Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs). These mechanisms help make local governments and public officials accountable to citizens, in accordance with the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance to realize citizens’ rights to “discuss” and “verify”.

Overall Provincial Performance. At the provincial level, vertical accountability has fallen recently after a steady improvement over time, attributing to the lower national average score in 2015 (Table 3.3). The largest drops in 2015 relate to the presence and effectiveness of CISBs and PIBs, which are set up to represent citizens on oversight at the grassroots level. The effectiveness of interactions between local authorities and citizens also seems to be on a downward trend, although only slightly. Da Nang has topped this sub-dimension for two years in a row. During the 2011-2015 period, Da Nang, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh and Quang Tri have been more greatly appreciated by citizens in their interactions with local authorities than other provinces.

Overall, the north-central provinces have remained among the top and high average performers in the ‘Vertical Accountability’ dimension during the past five years (Map 3.3). A new promising trend can be seen in the north-western and south-western regions, with more provinces in these regions appearing in the top performing groups.

On provincial performance over time, Figure 3.3b shows positive and significant changes in one third of provinces, with Bac Ninh’s score increasing by 23% over five years. The steepest drop, nearly 15%, is seen in Ha Nam.

Interactions with Local Authorities. This sub-dimension features the frequency and effectiveness of interactions between citizens and local authorities and of citizen proposals to local governments. The interactions are through ad-hoc inquiries to village heads, periodical meetings with public officials and/or voter meetings with People’s Council members and/or with National Assembly delegates. Over the past five years, interaction between local authorities and citizens has been irregular (Figure 3.3a1). In 2015, nearly 20% of citizens contacted their village head and about 14% contacted commune officials. The rates range between less than 2% (Ninh Binh) to over 31% (Can Tho) for commune government and citizen interactions in 2015. Despite higher interaction frequencies nationwide, the effectiveness was lower than in previous years for both types of grassroots authority-citizen encounters (Figure 3.3a2). Since 2011, the proportion of citizens making suggestions to local governments has hovered around one in four. However, in 2015 only 82% of those who submitted proposals said their suggestions were acknowledged, lower than previously reported although still high.

People’s Inspection Boards. This sub-dimension measures the coverage and effectiveness of PIBs, a grassroots and people-elected mechanism to keep local public officials accountable to citizens. In theory, PIBs should be established in all communes. The 2015 findings reveal a reduction in citizens’ belief in the presence and effectiveness of PIBs and a lower level of understanding of how they are established, compared to the previous four years. Only 30% said there is a PIB in their locality. Among those who were aware of the existence of PIBs, more than 33% said PIBs are established by citizen voting (which is correct), while nearly 79% noted they were effective (Figures 3.3a1 and 3.3a2). In Nam Dinh, more than 78% of respondents said they have PIBs, while in Binh Duong only 7% agreed this was the case. Among those respondents in Binh Duong who said PIBs were in place, only 17% found them effective.
Community Investment Supervision Boards. This sub-dimension is about the coverage and effectiveness of CISBs, another grassroots mechanism for citizens to supervise local development projects. Similar to findings in previous years, in 2015 only 19% of respondents across the country said there were CISBs in their communities. Of these, about 81% said the boards work effectively, the lowest proportion over the past five years (Figures 3.3a1 and 3.3a2). Less than 1% of respondents in Binh Duong said that there were CISBs in their locality. Of those in Yen Bai who saw CISBs operate in their commune, about half (53%) said the boards were effective. Binh Duong and Yen Bai are at the lower ends of the scale in these two indicators respectively (Table 3.3).

Recommendations. Despite the political support for social feedback and citizen oversight in recent years,30 not much seems to have been done to actively encourage this. It is recommended that local authorities interact more with citizens through regular and ad-hoc meetings as chartered in the provincial decisions on meetings with citizens and constituents. The Law on Citizen Reception, effective from July 2014, provides the legal framework for better government-citizen interactions. It is expected that with this law, local governments will have concrete interaction mechanisms in place to improve this aspect.

Another recommendation is that the Viet Nam Fatherland Front, mass organizations and civil society should play a key role in reviewing the interaction mechanisms and finding ways to improve their effectiveness. To ensure more effective PIIBs and CISBs these institutions should be combined, be better equipped with technical skills, be better resourced and more actively engage with citizens and civil society organizations. Also, local governments should comply with Government Decree No. 84/2015/ND-CP on monitoring and evaluation of public investment projects, especially the provisions on engaging communities, in particular CISBs, in the supervision of such projects.

30 See Decisions 217-QD/TW and 218-QD/TW of the Politburo dated 12 December 2013 providing for social feedback and citizen monitoring mechanisms by the Viet Nam Fatherland Front, mass organizations and citizens.
Map 3.3: Provincial Performance in Vertical Accountability by Quartiles in 2015

Vertical Accountability
- Best Performers
- High Average
- Low Average
- Poor Performers
Table 3.3: List of Indicators on Vertical Accountability (Dimension 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</th>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>National Mean</th>
<th>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</th>
<th>Provinical PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total Dimension</td>
<td>Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>5.50 5.58 5.65 5.73 5.46</td>
<td>Low 5.33 High 5.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum Median Maximum 4.70 5.58 7.51</td>
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<td>Ha Giang TT-Hue Ha Tinh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Dimension 1</td>
<td>Interactions with Local Authorities</td>
<td>0.33 3.3</td>
<td>1.87 1.88 1.78 1.85 1.83</td>
<td>Low 1.78 High 1.87</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum Median Maximum 1.42 1.85 2.29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tuyen Quang Khanh Hoa Da Nang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Dimension 2</td>
<td>People's Inspection Boards</td>
<td>0.33 3.3</td>
<td>1.85 1.87 1.97 1.94 1.78</td>
<td>Low 1.73 High 1.84</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum Median Maximum 1.46 1.80 2.66</td>
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<td>Kien Giang Ninh Binh Ha Tinh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Dimension 3</td>
<td>Community Investment Supervision Boards</td>
<td>0.34 3.4</td>
<td>1.78 1.83 1.90 1.94 1.85</td>
<td>Low 1.80 High 1.89</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum Median Maximum 1.53 1.88 2.74</td>
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<td>Kien Giang Lang Son Ha Tinh</td>
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<td>S1. Interactions with Local Authorities</td>
<td>Contacted Village Head (%)</td>
<td>d301a1</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>18.54% 18.07% 14.01% 16.70% 19.98%</td>
<td>Low 18.17% High 21.79%</td>
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<td>Minimum Median Maximum 1.87% 18.34% 51.92%</td>
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<td>Bac Giang BRVT Can Tho</td>
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<td>S1. Interactions with Local Authorities</td>
<td>Contacted Commune People's Committee (%)</td>
<td>d301b2</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>12.20% 12.01% 8.77% 11.98% 14.44%</td>
<td>Low 12.55% High 16.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum Median Maximum 1.88% 10.50% 31.64%</td>
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<td>Ninh Binh Phu Yen Can Tho</td>
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<td>S1. Interactions with Local Authorities</td>
<td>Contact with Village Head Successful (%)</td>
<td>d301a1</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>87.96% 86.82% 84.37% 86.37% 78.98%</td>
<td>Low 72.16% High 85.80%</td>
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<td>Minimum Median Maximum 37.97% 82.10% 100%</td>
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<td>Contact with Commune Successful (%)</td>
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<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>80.49% 82.82% 77.80% 80.94% 71.03%</td>
<td>Low 61.28% High 80.77%</td>
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<td>Minimum Median Maximum 7.57% 77.14% 99.69%</td>
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<td>Binh Duong Tien Giang Phu Tho</td>
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<td>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</td>
<td>Name of Indicator</td>
<td>Survey Question</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</td>
<td>Provincial PAPI 2015 Scores</td>
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<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
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<td>PAPI 2012</td>
<td>PAPI 2013</td>
<td>PAPI 2014</td>
<td>PAPI 2015</td>
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<td>S1. Interactions with Local Authorities</td>
<td>Made a Proposal to Authorities (%)</td>
<td>d302a1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>23.36%</td>
<td>25.96%</td>
<td>24.32%</td>
<td>26.04%</td>
<td>24.93%</td>
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<td>Proposal Successful (%)</td>
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<td>87.28%</td>
<td>87.73%</td>
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<td>Village Has a PIB (%)</td>
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<td>33.18%</td>
<td>36.56%</td>
<td>35.72%</td>
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<td>S2. People's Inspection Boards</td>
<td>PIB Selected by Vote (%)</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>43.54%</td>
<td>42.55%</td>
<td>45.93%</td>
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<tr>
<td>S2. People's Inspection Boards</td>
<td>PIB Effective (%)</td>
<td>d303c</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78.70%</td>
<td>78.64%</td>
<td>82.90%</td>
<td>80.58%</td>
<td>78.94%</td>
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<td>S3. Community Investment Supervision Boards</td>
<td>Commune Has a CISB (%)</td>
<td>d304</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>14.48%</td>
<td>16.69%</td>
<td>17.16%</td>
<td>19.01%</td>
<td>19.03%</td>
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<td>S3. Community Investment Supervision Boards</td>
<td>CISB Effective (%)</td>
<td>d304b</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>81.65%</td>
<td>83.23%</td>
<td>86.06%</td>
<td>87.12%</td>
<td>81.36%</td>
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Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum
CHAPTER 3


Figure 3.3a1: Frequency of Interaction

- Contacted Commune People’s Committee Official: 23.36% (2011), 24.93% (2012), 33.84% (2013), 30.06% (2014), 43.54% (2015)
- Made a Proposal to Authorities: 33.84% (2011), 30.06% (2012), 14.48% (2013), 78.70% (2014), 81.65% (2015)
- Commune has a People’s Inspection Board: 30.06% (2011), 33.84% (2012), 33.62% (2013), 19.03% (2014), 10% (2015)
- Commune has a Community Investment Supervision Board: 78.70% (2011), 78.94% (2012), 81.36% (2013), 81.65% (2014), 81.36% (2015)

Figure 3.3a2: Citizen Satisfaction upon Interaction

- Contact w/Village Head Successful: 87.96% (2011), 80.49% (2012), 71.03% (2013), 82.31% (2014), 81.36% (2015)
- Contact w/Commune Successful: 78.98% (2011), 80.49% (2012), 78.70% (2013), 78.94% (2014), 81.36% (2015)
- Proposal Successful: 87.28% (2011), 82.31% (2012), 78.70% (2013), 78.94% (2014), 81.36% (2015)
- PIB Effective: 81.65% (2011), 81.65% (2012), 81.65% (2013), 81.65% (2014), 81.65% (2015)
- CISB Effective: 81.36% (2011), 81.36% (2012), 81.36% (2013), 81.36% (2014), 81.36% (2015)
Figure 3.3b: Changes in Performance in Vertical Accountability
(% - 2015 against 2011)

Note: Y = percentage of change in 2015 data from 2011 data, with a change of ±5% defined as statistically significant.
**Dimension 4: Control of Corruption**

The ‘Control of Corruption’ dimension is comprised of four sub-dimensions: (i) limits on public sector corruption, (ii) limits on corruption in public service delivery, (iii) equity in state employment and (iv) willingness to fight corruption. It measures the performance of institutions and local governments in controlling corruption as well as the tolerance of corruption practices by both authorities and citizens. This section also suggests measures to address systemically embedded corruption practices.

**Overall Provincial Performance.** There has been a reduction in positive provincial performance in control of corruption in all four aspects PAPI measures compared to 2013, where PAPI witnessed an improvement in this area. Table 3.4 shows that the biggest reduction is in the ‘limits on public sector corruption’ sub-dimension, which has now dropped to the 2011 level after having risen for a couple of years. The same observations apply to the other three sub-dimensions. Tra Vinh was the best performing province in 2015 thanks to its highest scores in the ‘limits on corruption in public service delivery’ and ‘equity in state employment’ sub-dimensions. Nam Dinh was the best performer in terms of willingness to fight corruption from both local authorities and local citizens.

As observed during the previous cycles of PAPI research, regional patterns have been strong in this dimension over the last five years. Central and southern provinces tend to do better in anti-corruption efforts than northern provinces. Among the top 16 best performers, 11 are southern provinces and four are from the central region (see Map 3.4). Long An and Soc Trang have been in the best performing group for five years in a row, while Ha Noi has been in the poorest performing group for the same period.

On a more encouraging note, there are more provinces who have seen improvements after five years in this dimension than the first, second and third PAPI dimensions. More than one third of provinces significantly improved their performance, with their average dimensional scores increasing by 5% and more compared to the 2011 scores (Figure 3.4b). In particular, Tra Vinh’s dimensional score increased by 47% over five years and Cao Bang’s score by 33%. At the opposite end of the scale Binh Duong saw the sharpest drop, by more than 30%, compared to 2011.

**Limits on Public Sector Corruption.** This sub-dimension is comprised of three indicators, including (i) no diversion of public funds by officials, (ii) no bribes for land titles and (iii) no kickback for construction permits. The indicators reflect whether citizens experience such forms of corrupt practices in everyday interactions with local governments. Compared to the previous two years, the 2015 findings are less optimistic as fewer citizens agreed that public officials did not divert public funds for private use, ask for bribes when handling land use rights certificates or ask for kickbacks when handling construction permits. Quang Tri, Can Tho and Tra Vinh topped the rating in the three respective indicators, while Ha Giang, Binh Duong and Ho Chi Minh City were the worst performers in each of the three indicators (Table 3.4).

**Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery.** This sub-dimension measures the level of corruption perceived and experienced by citizens when using public health care and primary schools. Here citizens are asked about bribes at public district hospitals and bribes for teachers’ favouritism at public primary schools. Similar to findings in the first sub-dimension, there was a decline in the number of respondents who felt that public health-care workers and primary teachers said no to bribes, compared to the previous two years. Table 3.4 shows that in Tra Vinh 75% of respondents did not find that users have to pay bribes when accessing public health care at district hospitals in the province. However, in half of the provinces this is only the case for between 28% and 47% of respondents, indicating that bribery in public hospitals is still widely prevalent. Similarly, addressing bribery at public primary schools remains a challenge for almost every province. In half of the country, only between 36% and 59% of respondents claim that bribery does not take place at primary schools. Bac Giang is the best performing province in this indicator, with 82.5% of respondents saying that bribery does not take place at primary schools. Bac Giang is the best performing province in this indicator, with 82.5% of respondents saying that bribery does not take place at primary schools. Bac Giang.

**Equity in State Employment.** Equity in state employment contributes significantly to a strong and non-corrupt state apparatus. However, it seems difficult to reach this goal, especially when personal relationships and informal payments still play an important role for those who wish to pursue their careers in the public sector. As evidenced in PAPI findings over the past five years, nepotism in public sector employment has become a systemic problem
(Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4a1). Figure 3.4a1 even shows a downward trend in the national average scores of the ‘no relationship required for state jobs’ indicator. For example, in Ha Noi only about 14% of respondents believed that they do not need to pay a bribe when seeking state employment. In Ha Giang, for the second year in a row, citizens also believe that personal relationships are crucial when applying for state employment, with almost none of the respondents saying that the five public sector posts that were asked about in the survey are free from nepotism.

**Willingness to Fight Corruption.** This sub-dimension reveals the willingness and efforts of both local governments and citizens to combat corruption in their localities. As shown in Table 3.4, fewer respondents would agree that corruption had no effect on them, and a much lower percentage of respondents agree that provincial leaders are serious about combating corruption compared to 2013 and 2014. In Kien Giang almost every respondent said corruption had no effect on them, while in Ninh Binh only 57% said their provincial authorities were serious about addressing corruption. Figure 3.4a2 also shows a declining willingness to denounce public officials who collect bribes. In 2015, very few victims of bribery requests (less than 3%) would denounce corrupt acts by local government officials. While the rate is 0% in half of the country, nearly 80% of Long An bribe victims said they reported bribe takers. The tolerance of bribe amounts surged in 2015 compared to the previous four years, with victims of corruption saying they would not denounce the case unless the bribe being asked for reached around VND24 million (Figure 3.4a3). Hai Phong citizens would not take any action unless the bribe was over VND72 million, while in Quang Ngai the tolerance level is about ten times less at VND7.3 million.

**Recommendations.** As the 2015 PAPI findings for this dimension reflect, provincial performance in control of corruption is on a downward trend, especially when compared to some promising trends in 2013. Citizens across the country witnessed more prevalence of nepotism in state employment, bribery in the public sector and lack of willingness to fight corruption from both the local government and citizens themselves. It is important for poorer performing provinces to learn from better performing ones about their experiences in ensuring better equity in state employment, less bribery for public services and fewer incidences of public officials making use of their power to earn informal payments from state fund diversion, provision of public administrative services and state recruitment. A stronger willingness from citizens to report corrupt acts can be facilitated by the participation of both non-government actors and the media, who can serve as channels for citizens to report corruption. This will help Viet Nam to overcome systematic and spreading corruption.
Map 3.4: Provincial Performance in Control of Corruption by Quartiles in 2015

Control of Corruption in the Public Sector
- Best Performers
- High Average
- Low Average
- Poor Performers
### Table 3.4: List of Indicators on Control of Corruption (Dimension 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</th>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>National Mean</th>
<th>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</th>
<th>Provincial PAPI 2014 Scores</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Dimension 4: Control of Corruption</td>
<td>Limits on Public Sector Corruption</td>
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<td>S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption</td>
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<td>S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery</td>
<td>Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Dimension and Sub-Dimensions

### Name of Indicator

- S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery
  - No Bribes for Teachers’ Favouritism (% agree)
  - Survey Question: d402d
  - Scale: 0% - 100%
  - Min: 0%  median: 59.14%  Max: 63.07%
  - Provinces: Lao Cai, Kien Giang, Bac Giang

- S3. Equity in State Employment
  - No Bribes for State Employment (% agree)
  - Survey Question: d402f
  - Scale: 0% - 100%
  - Min: 13.98%  median: 38.53%  Max: 84.11%
  - Provinces: Hai Duong, Kien Giang, Quang Ninh

- S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption
  - Corruption Had no Effect on Respondent (%)
    - Survey Question: d405a
    - Scale: 0% - 100%
    - Min: 78.66%  median: 96.26%  Max: 100%
    - Provinces: Kien Giang, Hai Duong, Bac Giang
  - Know Anti-Corruption Law (%)
    - Survey Question: d405b
    - Scale: 0% - 100%
    - Min: 42.45%  median: 44.11%  Max: 44.11%
    - Provinces: Lai Chau, Phu Tho, Ha Tinh
  - Province Serious about Combating Corruption (%)
    - Survey Question: d407
    - Scale: 0% - 100%
    - Min: 34.00%  median: 34.00%  Max: 34.00%
    - Provinces: Long An, Quang Ninh, Hai Phong
  - Denunciation Price ‘000s VND (Imputed)
    - Survey Question: d404
    - Scale: 0 - 150,000
    - Min: 7,340  median: 21,731  Max: 71,914
    - Provinces: Quang Ninh, Hai Duong, Hai Phong

### Note:
- (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum
Figure 3.4a: Trends in Key Indicators in Dimension 4

- **Figure 3.4a1: Relationship Needed for State Employment**
  - (0 = Relationship very important; 5 = No relationship needed)

- **Figure 3.4a2: Citizen Willingness to Fight Corruption**
  - (Percentage of victims of bribery reporting bribe-taking acts)
  - 2011: 9.15%, 2012: 7.01%, 2013: 2.95%, 2014: 2.96%, 2015: 2.67%

- **Figure 3.4a3: Denunciation Price (VND, imputed)**
  - 2011: 0%, 2012: 5%, 2013: 10%, 2014: 15%, 2015: 20%
Figure 3.4b: Changes in Performance in Control of Corruption
(\% - 2015 against 2011)

Note: $Y =$ percentage of change in 2015 data from 2011 data, with a change of ±5\% defined as statistically significant.
Dimension 5: Public Administrative Procedures

This dimension looks at the quality of public administrative services in areas important to citizens. This includes certification services as well as application procedures for construction permits, land use rights certificates and personal documents. In particular, the dimension looks at how professional and responsive the administrative services provided are. The eight criteria used to measure the quality of the services include: (i) the clarity of application procedures, (ii) publicity of application fees, (iii) competence of civil servants, (iv) behaviour of civil servants, (v) reasonable paperwork load, (vi) notification of deadlines, (vii) receipt of results within the set deadline and (viii) overall service satisfaction.

Overall Provincial Performance. This dimension has displayed little improvement over the years in overall levels of citizen satisfaction. The gap between the poorest performing province (with the score of 5.9 for Quang Ngai) and the best one (with the score of 7.51 for Bac Ninh) is narrower in this dimension than in the previous four dimensions. This means a convergence of provinces around a narrow band. Among the four sub-dimensions, certification services were rated poorer in 2015 compared to previous years, services for land titles improved a little, while the other two sub-dimensions remained unchanged (Table 3.5).

There is no regional pattern in this dimension (see Map 3.5), unlike what is seen in the previous dimensions, but similar to what was observed in this dimension during previous years. Da Nang, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh and Nam Dinh have been in the best performing group since 2011, while only Soc Trang has been in the poorest performing group for five consecutive years.

There is also little change in provincial performance in delivering public administrative services during the period from 2011-2015. As Figure 3.5b indicates, more than two thirds of provinces have hardly seen any change over five years. Only six provinces posted significant improvement, with the most change happening in Can Tho (with an increase of about 16% compared to the 2011 benchmark).

Public Certification Services. This sub-dimension measures provincial performance in providing certification services to citizens at district and commune levels. In 2015, there was a decline in the dimensional score in this sub-dimension at the national aggregate level. At the provincial level, Binh Phuoc emerged as the top performer with a score of 1.88, while Tra Vinh came last with a score of 1.14 on a scale from 0.25-2.5 points (Table 3.5). About 33% of respondents across the country said they used the certification services at their commune People’s Committee, district justice office or other public office. The level of citizen satisfaction with this service remains the highest of the four administrative services measured (Figure 3.5a2), although there was a slight reduction in the total quality score due to some limitation in the transparency of fees and other charges (Figure 3.5a4).

Application Procedures for Construction Permits. The quality of construction permits granted to civil construction projects (e.g. building, expanding or remodelling houses in anything more than a basic way) has been relatively stable over the past five years. However, the one-stop shops in provincial departments and district divisions of construction did not seem to function well, since the rate of applicants who did not have to go to several public offices to get their paperwork done fell to 69% in 2015 from the 87% reported in the previous four years. This is a much sharper drop than access to one-stop shops for services for land titles and personal documents (Figure 3.5a3). The score on total quality of the services also declined in 2015, falling from around 6.6-6.8 in the previous four years to 6.2. The key reason for this was the somewhat limited transparency of the fees charged (Figure 3.5a4). On a more encouraging note, most of the respondents who applied for construction permits were successful, and in Soc Trang for example almost everyone got the construction permits they applied for in 2015.

Application Procedures for Land Use Rights Certificates. PAPI also measures provincial performance in the provision of land use rights certificates (LURCs) for citizens and the quality of LURC-related administrative services. This covers application procedures for new LURCs, LURC

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31 See CECODES, VFF-CRT and UNDP (2015, p.72).
renewals and transferring of LURCs at provincial, district and commune levels. As Figures 3.5a2 and 3.5a3 show, although citizen access to the one-stop shop service for land titles has remained constant, the total quality of the service has been the poorest of the four services measured since 2011, and has even declined significantly compared with previous years. Key reasons for the decline in 2015 were failures in delivering results within the promised deadlines, too much paperwork required and a lack of transparency in fees and charges (Figure 3.5a4). On the deadline for results, nearly 57% of applicants received their land titles after 30 days, as required by law. However, as many as 22% had to wait 100 days or more for the final results. About 6% of applicants nationwide still had to count on solicitation from intermediaries for the paperwork to be completed. Dong Thap made progress in the quality of the service provided, while Quang Ngai needs to do a lot more to catch up with other provinces (Table 3.5).

**Recommendations.** It is clear from the findings that transparency in application fees and meeting deadlines are key attributes of higher user satisfaction with the four administrative services. Ways to increase citizen satisfaction with public administrative services could therefore include relevant local government agencies displaying fees and charges at the one-stop shops and notifying applicants of any changes in deadlines. For commune-level administrative services, an additional point to note is the competence of commune officials handling procedures for applicants, which needs to improve.

For land title related services, it is important for provincial departments of environment and natural resources in all provinces to strengthen and supervise the functioning of district affiliates by almost every criterion in order to increase user satisfaction. By providing clear information about required procedures, increasing the transparency of fees and charges, simplifying paperwork requirements, providing clear deadlines of when final results will be returned and performing the service within the promised deadline the service will improve. All these suggestions are also covered in the 2013 Land Law and its by-laws, which relevant local government agencies have to implement.

**Application Procedures for Personal Documents at Commune Level.** This sub-dimension measures the performance of commune-level People’s Committees in addressing applications for different types of personal documents. This is the most stable sub-dimension as there has been almost no change in the national average score over time (Figure 3.5a1). In 2015, about 34% of respondents had their personal documents processed at the commune level. Of these, nearly 96% had a good experience with the service. In terms of one-stop shops at the commune level, these saw a slightly lower level of user satisfaction in 2015 compared to previous years. Limited transparency in fees and charges for the service and limited competence of the civil servants operating the service displeased applicants across the country. There is also a large variance in provincial performance in this sub-dimension, with Thai Binh getting a score of 7.72 (the highest) while Quang Ninh only got 4.67 (the lowest).

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12 According to Article 61 of Government Decree No. 43/2014/ND-CP from 15 May 2015 providing guidance on implementation of the 2013 Land Law.

13 These are administrative procedures for personal papers such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, death notifications, ethnicity-related procedures, residency registrations, and housing and employment subsidies. They are selected from the list of administrative procedures that commune-level People’s Committees are delegated to process for citizens.
Map 3.5: Provincial Performance in Public Administrative Procedures by Quartiles in 2015
### Dimension and Sub-Dimensions

#### Name of Indicator

#### Survey Question

#### Scale

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### Table 3.5: List of Indicators on Public Administrative Procedures (Dimension 5)

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<tr>
<th>Sub-Dimension</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
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<th>Minimum</th>
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<td>Number of Certification Procedures</td>
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<td>Number of Certification Procedures</td>
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<td>Sub-Dimension 2</td>
<td>Construction Permits</td>
<td>Number of Construction Permits</td>
<td>0.05-2.5</td>
<td>Number of Construction Permits</td>
<td>0.05-2.5</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<td>Sub-Dimension 3</td>
<td>Land Procedures</td>
<td>Number of Land Procedures</td>
<td>0.05-2.5</td>
<td>Number of Land Procedures</td>
<td>0.05-2.5</td>
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<td>Sub-Dimension 4</td>
<td>Personal Procedures at Commune Level</td>
<td>Number of Personal Procedures at Commune Level</td>
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<td>Number of Personal Procedures at Commune Level</td>
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### Additional Data

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<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
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### Footnotes

- Table 3.5: List of Indicators on Public Administrative Procedures (Dimension 5)
- Additional data provided for specific indicators.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</th>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
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<th>Scale</th>
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<th>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</th>
<th>Provincial PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
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<td>Min</td>
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<td>S2. Construction Permits</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>10.64%</td>
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<td>S3. Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures</td>
<td>Did not Use Many Windows for Land Use Rights Certificates (%)</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>84.68%</td>
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<td>Received Land Title (%)</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>82.48%</td>
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<td>Took Part in Personal Administrative Procedures (%)</td>
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<td>Total Quality of Personal Procedures (8 criteria)</td>
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<td>6.91</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>93.14%</td>
<td>94.57%</td>
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Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum
Figure 3.5a: Trends in Key Indicators in Dimension 5

Figure 3.5a1: Trend at Sub-Dimensional Level

Figure 3.5a2: Total Quality of Public Administrative Services Over Time (by 8 criteria)

Figure 3.5a3: Access to One-stop Shops for Public Administrative Services
Figure 3.5.4: Public Administrative Service Quality (by 9 Criteria)

- a. Clear information about the procedures was available.
- b. The amount I would have to pay in fees for the service was publicly displayed.
- c. The officials were competent.
- d. The officials treated me with respect.
- e. The procedure requires little paperwork.
- f. I/my family don’t have to pay bribes to obtain the service.
- g. I was provided with a clear deadline by which the service would be performed.
- h. The service was performed within the stated deadline.
- i. I am satisfied with the service I received.
Figure 3.5b: Changes in Performance in Public Administrative Procedures
(\% - 2015 against 2011)

Note: Y = percentage of change in 2015 data from 2011 data, with a change of ±5\% defined as statistically significant.
Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery

The ‘Public Service Delivery’ dimension looks at four public services, including health care, primary education, basic infrastructure and residential law and order. Similar to previous PAPI surveys, citizens were asked about their direct experience with the accessibility, quality and availability of these services in 2015.

Overall Provincial Performance. Findings from the survey show a stable trend in provincial performance in public service delivery over the past five years. The gap between the best performing province (Vinh Long with a dimensional score of 7.76) and the poorest one (Dak Nong with a score of 6.32) is the narrowest among the six dimensions. This means a strong convergence of provinces at the same level. Among the four sub-dimensions, public health care was rated poorer in 2015 compared to previous years, basic infrastructure was seen to slightly improve, while public primary education and law and order stayed consistent (Table 3.6).

In this dimension, better performers tend to be concentrated more in the south than in other regions of the country (see Map 3.6). This is the same pattern seen over the past five years. Five provinces (Vinh Long, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, Kien Giang and Ba Ria-Vung Tau) have been in the best performing group since 2011. Meanwhile, Binh Phuoc and Dak Nong have been in the poorest performing group for five consecutive years.

On the whole, none of the provinces have fallen behind dramatically over the past five years. As Figure 3.6b shows, 28 provinces have seen some improvement over five years (with the increase in provincial scores ranging between 5% and 17%), while the rest saw insignificant changes. Most impressive are Ha Giang, Hung Yen and Ninh Binh, who saw an increase by more than 15% in their 2015 dimensional score compared to the 2011 benchmark.

Public Health Care. This sub-dimension measures the performance of public district hospitals and the quality of public health insurance from a user perspective. User satisfaction with the quality of public hospitals has fallen to the lowest score in five years (Figure 3.6a1). There was also a wide difference between the best and poorest performers, with scores ranging from 8.21 in Son La to only 0.41 in Binh Duong (Table 3.6). User feedback shows that public district hospitals continue to face problems with patients sharing beds, waiting time between entering hospitals and getting treatment, dirty treatment rooms, ineffective treatment resulting in diseases or injuries not being cured and doctors advising the purchase of medicine at private pharmacies. On access to health insurance, 61% of respondents nationwide said they had health insurance cards, and those holding the cards were relatively positive about the quality of health insurance received (Table 3.6).

Public Primary Education. The key indicators used to construct this sub-dimension are the distance in kilometres from home to school, the length of time in minutes required for children to go to school and the total quality of primary schools. Findings from the 2015 survey show that the quality of public primary education is an area of citizen concern. This is revealed in the dimensional score of 1.68, a significant distance from the highest possible score of 2.5 (Table 3.6). Almost every province has since 2011 been struggling to meet minimum government quality criteria. These criteria include that teachers should not give preferential treatment to students taking their own extracurricular classes, the number of students in each class should be 36 or below, there should be access to drinking water and clean toilets at schools and school administrators should inform parents about the school’s revenue and budget expenditure. Dak Nong was rated the poorest performer in terms of the quality of public primary schools, with only 2 points on a scale of 0-9. Meanwhile, Dong Thap got the highest score of almost 6.9 points.

34 See CECODES, VFF-CRT and UNDP (2015, p.84).
Basic Infrastructure. Citizen satisfaction with basic infrastructure provided by local governments (i.e. access to electricity, quality of roads nearest houses, frequency of garbage collections in residential areas and quality of drinking water) is captured in this dimension. Mountainous provinces in particular face challenges in this area. About 97% of households across the country had access to electricity in 2015. However, access to national gridlines in Lai Chau was reported by only 58% of respondents (Table 3.6). On quality of roads, Tuyen Quang moved up to the best performer position as respondents there said that most of the local roads were asphalt roads, while Ha Giang was at the bottom of the list. In Da Nang, almost every household had access to clean water at home, while in Gia Lai this was only the case for 2% of households.

Law and Order. The levels of safety experienced by citizens in everyday life is reflected by a trio of indicators, namely safety levels in localities, changes in safety levels and crime rates in localities (vehicle theft, robbery, break-ins and physical violence). There has been little improvement in law and order at the provincial level since 2011 (see Figure 3.6a3). In 2015, nearly 16% of respondents nationwide reported they were victims of one of the four types of crime, 2% more than in 2014. About 49% of respondents in Quang Binh were victims of a crime, as opposed to just 1% in Tra Vinh. Respondents living in Can Tho felt a lot safer than those living in Kon Tum in terms of residential safety.

Recommendations. Although citizens assess that provincial performance in public service delivery and basic infrastructure is relatively stable, it is important for provinces to continue improving these services. Better public services, in particular health and education, will bring about better human resources that can foster innovation and creativity. Better infrastructure and law and order will help boost productivity and efficiency. Poorer provinces, especially those in the northwest and Central Highlands regions, need to invest more in basic public services so that more equitable opportunities are created and their citizens are able to catch up with citizens in other provinces. It is better for these poorer provinces to cease investing state budget in large city halls or squares, as a number of provinces have been doing, and rather invest in public hospitals, schools, roads and basic infrastructure as this can unleash local potential and lead to sustainable development.

35 See for instance VnExpress (5/8/2015) about the poor north-western province of Son La deciding to spend VND1,400 billion (equivalent to USD62 million) from the state budget to develop the province’s central square and statues. The decision was publicly scrutinized and led to the central government’s request to downsize the scope and scale of the project (see the news posted on the Prime Minister/Government web portal on 6 August 2015 at http://thutuong.chinhphu.vn/Home/Thu-tuong-chi-dao-UBND-tinh-Son-La-ve-viec-xay-dung-tuong-dai-Bac-Ho/20158/23498.vgp). Son La has been in the poorest performing group in the ‘Public Service Delivery’ dimension since 2012 (see the 2014 PAPI Report, p.84 and Map 3.6).
Map 3.6: Provincial Performance in Public Service Delivery by Quartiles in 2015

Public Service Delivery
- Best Performers
- High Average
- Low Average
- Poor Performers
### Table 3.6: List of Indicators on Public Service Delivery (Dimension 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</th>
<th>Name of Indicator</th>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>National Mean</th>
<th>National PAPI 2015 (95% CI)</th>
<th>Provincial PAPI 2015 Scores</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
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<td>Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Dimension 1</td>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Public Health Survey</td>
<td>0.25, 2.5</td>
<td>1.65, 1.78, 1.68, 1.66</td>
<td>1.65, 1.56, 2.04</td>
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<td>Public Education</td>
<td>Public Education Survey</td>
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<td>Sub-Dimension 3</td>
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<td>Basic Infrastructure Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>S1. Public Health</td>
<td>Population with Health Insurance (%)</td>
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<td>0% - 100%</td>
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<td>S1. Public Health</td>
<td>Quality of Health Insurance (4 pt scale)</td>
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<td>S1. Public Health</td>
<td>Quality of Free Medical Care for Children (5 pt scale)</td>
<td>d603c</td>
<td>0 - 5</td>
<td>3.85, 3.92, 3.91, 4.00</td>
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<td>S1. Public Health</td>
<td>Poor Households are Subsidized (%)</td>
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<td>S1. Public Health</td>
<td>Checks for Children are Free (%)</td>
<td>d603a</td>
<td>0% - 100%</td>
<td>69.55%, 73.03%, 72.59%, 72.71%</td>
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<td>Total Hospital Quality (10 criteria)</td>
<td>d604da-d604dk</td>
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<td>S2. Public Education</td>
<td>Kilometre Walk to School</td>
<td>d606ca</td>
<td>Min, Max</td>
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<td>1.02, 1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dimension and Sub-Dimensions</td>
<td>Name of Indicator</td>
<td>Survey Question</td>
<td>Scale</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Number of Minutes Travelling to School</td>
<td>d606cb Min Max</td>
<td>0 5</td>
<td>3.96 3.97</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>3.94 4.01</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Overall Rating of Primary School (1-5 scale)</td>
<td>d606ce Min Max</td>
<td>0 5</td>
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<td>National Mean</td>
<td>4.75 4.75</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Total School Quality (9 criteria)</td>
<td>d606da Min Max</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Frequency of Garbage Pick-up (0=Never; 4=Every Day)</td>
<td>d606b Min Max</td>
<td>0 4</td>
<td>1.92 2.62</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Share Drinking Tap Water (%)</td>
<td>d606c Min Max</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>34.80% 40.27%</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>41.94% 45.72%</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Share Drinking Unclean Water (%)</td>
<td>d606d Min Max</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>6.41% 6.41%</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>7.91% 7.91%</td>
<td>Dak Nong Ninh Binh Dong Thap</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>How Safe is Locality (3=Very Safe)</td>
<td>d510a Min Max</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>1.97 1.97</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>1.97 2.03</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Change in Safety Over Time</td>
<td>d510b Min Max</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
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<td>14.98% 15.29%</td>
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<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Crime Rate in Locality (%)</td>
<td>d511a Min Max</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>18.26% 18.26%</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>19.71% 19.71%</td>
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<tr>
<td>S1. Public Education</td>
<td>Victims of Crime</td>
<td>d511b Min Max</td>
<td>0% 100%</td>
<td>13.44% 13.44%</td>
<td>National Mean</td>
<td>15.43% 15.43%</td>
<td>Dak Lak Dong Nai</td>
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</table>
Figure 3.6a: Trends in Key Indicators in Dimension 6

Figure 3.6a1: Total District Hospital Quality
(10 criteria)

Figure 3.6a2: Total Primary School Quality
(9 criteria)

Figure 3.6a3: Law and Order
(How Safe is Your Locality? 0=Very Unsafe; 4=Very Safe)
Figure 3.6b: Changes in Performance in Public Service Delivery
(% - 2015 against 2011)

Note: \( Y \) = percentage of change in 2015 data from 2011 data, with a change of \( \pm 5\% \) defined as statistically significant.
Aggregated 2015 PAPI Performance and Recommendations

This section wraps up by presenting 2015 provincial aggregate performance by quartiles and comparing this with the 2011 baselines. It also includes a snapshot of the correlation between the 2015 PAPI scores and the 2015 Provincial Competitiveness Index and 2014 provincial GDP per capita. Looking at the relationship between these helps to chart the governance context in general and also assists central and local governments to find ways to balance between the different, and sometimes competing, needs of citizens and businesses for human and economic development.

Overall Provincial Performance. Better performing provinces in terms of governance and public administration are found in the north-eastern, central and south-eastern regions. The poorest performing provinces are found along the northern border and in the south-central and Central Highlands regions. Map 3.7 shows this regional pattern, which has been consistent since 2011.

The efforts of local governments in Nam Dinh, Ha Tinh, Quang Tri, Da Nang and Long An, who have all been in the top performing group in overall provincial performance for the last five years, should be acknowledged (see Table 3.7). Thai Binh has been in the top performing group since 2012. At the other end of the scale, Lai Chau has been in the poorest performing group since 2011 and Ninh Thuan has been in the same group since 2012.

When comparing the 2015 PAPI results of each province against their 2011 baselines, seven provinces (Bac Ninh, Can Tho, Tra Vinh, Ninh Binh, Tay Ninh, Phu Tho and Ha Tinh) have improved significantly over time, with an increase in their aggregate scores between 9% and 11%. Meanwhile, as many as 13 provinces have seen significant drops in their scores over the course of five years. Of these, Ba Ria-Vung Tau and Binh Duong have witnessed the most severe decline, as compared to their 2011 baselines. A reason for the falling citizen satisfaction with the local government in Ba Ria-Vung Tau may be that the province changed the district capital to Ba Ria town in 2014. A lot of developments have since been taking place in Ba Ria, affecting the livelihoods of local citizens, while those residing in the former capital now have to go some distance to complete public administration services. In Binh Duong, a growing number of migrants from other parts of Viet Nam have moved to the province because of employment opportunities and this may have stretched public services, thereby affecting provincial performance.

It is also useful to look at the relationship between the 2015 PAPI scores and the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), which reflects feedback from businesses about provincial economic governance, as well as provincial 2014 GDP per capita. As the analysis below suggests, citizens and businesses have fundamental different points of view as to what constitutes good governance, despite operating in the same institutional setting of Viet Nam.

Figure 3.7b studies the relationship between the 2015 PAPI and PCI indices. The significant, positive correlation indicates that the two measures are tapping into similar levels of government assessments. Nevertheless, the relationship is far from perfect. This is to be expected. Citizens and businesses, the primary respondents in the PCI survey, have different views as to what constitutes good governance. While they may agree on issues such as transparency and corruption, on other issues such as the security of land tenure or regulation the interests of businesses and citizens are at odds. Moreover, the two groups also tend to have different expectations of government policies and governance measures.36

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36 See Malesky, Edmund (2016).
Figure 3.7c looks at the relationship between PAPI scores and provincial GDP per capita (measured in 2014 United States dollars). As figure 3.7c shows, there is little correlation between 2014 GDP per capita and the 2015 PAPI scores by province. In other words, there is very little relationship between the wealth of a province and citizen experiences of provincial governance. Richer provinces are not better able to offer their citizens greater opportunities for participation, access to information or less cumbersome regulatory procedures.

**Recommendations.** In order for poorer performing provinces to catch up with better performing ones, it is important for local governments to look at their own problems and address each one of them in a systematic manner. Provinces should look at concrete indicators that tell them more about where they have performed well and where they need to improve. With concrete action plans in place to respond to citizen expectations and by implementing these plans, local governments will be able to build trust and increase the confidence of their citizens.

The policy issues featured by PAPI are based on Viet Nam’s laws, regulations and policies, which cover all 63 provinces. For any policy matter that is essential for a citizen’s life and well-being (such as health care, land tenure and participation in policymaking), it is expected that central and local governments deliver. For those policy matters that have been difficult to implement (such as voter participation and oversight mechanisms like the People’s Inspection Boards or Community Investment Supervision Boards), it is time for provincial governments to demand reforms so that they can service the Vietnamese people better.

It is also important to create equity in access to good governance and public administration, especially for women, ethnic minorities, young people and citizens who are not party members. Finally, it is essential for central and local governments to balance the interests of human and economic development. Together, these actions will help Viet Nam harness its human potential, benefit the country’s development and support the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, which Viet Nam has committed to.
Map 3.7: Provincial Performance in Governance and Public Administration by Quartiles in 2015

Un-weighted 2015 PAPI

- Best Performers
- High Average
- Low Average
- Poor Performers
Table 3.7: Aggregate Performance by Province from 2011-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
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(*) Dimensions 1 to 6 are scaled with scores from "1" as minimum and "10" as maximum

**Colour code:**
- **Best Performers**: Above 75th percentile
- **High Average**: Between 50th and 75th percentile
- **Low Average**: Between 25th and 50th percentile
- **Poor Performers**: Below 25th percentile
Figure 3.7a: Changes in Aggregate PAPI Scores by Province
(unweighted, % - 2015 against 2011)

Note: Y = percentage of change in 2015 data from 2011 data, with a change of ±5% defined as statistically significant.
Figure 3.7b: Correlation with 2015 PCI

Figure 3.7c: Correlation with 2014 GDP per Capita


Government of Viet Nam (2015). Report on anti-corruption work in 2015 (Report No. 516/BC-CP) to XIII National Assembly [in which PAPI data was cited to reflect local governments’ efforts to improve transparency improvement].


Ministry of Planning and Investment (2013). Official Letter No. 1045/BKHĐT-KTĐN on implementation of the Vietnam Development Partnership [in which PAPI is used as an annual means of verification for the Government of Vietnam's implementation of its commitment to implementing policies and measures on sustainable development and social progress].


Thoi Bao Kinh Te Sai Gon (05/05/2014): Hiểu rõ về các chỉ số đo lường chất lượng điều hành của Việt Nam (Edmund Malesky, Jairo Acuña-Alfaro, Dau Anh Tuan). An article in response to the article “So sánh chỉ số PAPI và PCI: những câu hỏi còn đỗ” by Dr Le Dang Doanh, an independent senior economist with Thoi Bao Kinh Te Sai Gon (12/04/2014). Available at http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/114299/.


APPENDICES

Appendix A: Key Demographic Specifications of the PAPI 2015 Sample

Figure A: Comparison of Key Demographic Variables Over Time and with 2009 Census (%)

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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.41%</td>
<td>52.96%</td>
<td>52.67%</td>
<td>52.68%</td>
<td>52.92%</td>
<td>54.12%</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>50.59%</td>
<td>47.04%</td>
<td>47.33%</td>
<td>47.32%</td>
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<td>Kinh</td>
<td>85.73%</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>84.35%</td>
<td>84.57%</td>
<td>83.93%</td>
<td>83.89%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14.27%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>15.64%</td>
<td>15.43%</td>
<td>15.99%</td>
<td>15.94%</td>
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Figure A1: Kinh Ethnicity by Province in PAPI 2015 vs. National Census 2009
Figure A2: Age Distribution in PAPI 2015 Sample vs. National Census 2009
(excluding respondents aged 70 or above in PAPI sample)

Figure A3: Occupation of PAPI 2015 Respondents (%)
Figure A4: Education Levels of PAPI 2015 Respondents (%)
Appendix B: Key Changes to PAPI 2015 Research

To improve and strengthen the quality of the research methodology and implementation, in 2014 the PAPI initiative underwent a number of additional assessments. These included an external midterm review of the whole research package, an analysis of the sampling methodology, independent spot checks of the field surveys and independent data re-entry. The results indicated that the PAPI methodology was generally sound and reliable. The ‘probability proportional to size’ sampling strategy proved able to draw more representative samples and support more sophisticated survey experiments and shielded question techniques, PAPI moved from being a paper-based survey to a tablet-based and digital survey. Switching to this technique has proved to be inexpensive and has generated a number of positive benefits. These include real-time monitoring of fieldwork (i.e. instant field assistance provided to field controllers and enumerators during fieldwork and instant monitoring of the data collection progress by each village, each session and each day of the fieldwork), real-time data collection as data is transmitted instantly to PAPI’s cloud data hub and spot checks of collected data to notify fieldwork teams of any abnormality.

Change 1: Survey Administration Technology. To improve the efficiency of data entry, allow for real-time monitoring of data quality, improve the confidentiality of respondents and support more sophisticated survey experiments and shielded question techniques, PAPI went through a number of training courses. Several scenarios were raised so that the team could familiarize themselves with problems that may occur and how to solve these problems. The activities that were practiced included: 1) How to set up an interview venue; 2) How to distribute jobs and responsibilities among interviewers; 3) Reactions to problems that affect the interview environment and privacy; and 4) How to deliver an introduction of the PAPI survey to respondents. The team leaders became training assistants, focusing on observing pair-interviews, checking completed questionnaires and correcting interviewers’ mistakes. The first provincial roll-outs of the survey were also observed by one of the core PAPI team members, who travelled with the survey teams to oversee the process and tie up any loose ends. With the real-time monitoring system and data collected instantly from the first five provinces, key PAPI technical experts could examine data quality before rolling out the survey in all 63 provinces.

Change 2: New Training Protocols. The independent spot check by the Mekong Development Research Institute in 2014 revealed a number of discrepancies with training prior to survey implementation. Critically, training was not long enough and understanding of the survey protocols differed significantly between different teams, leading to a systematic bias in answers, a dangerous problem for a survey that aims to compare across regions. In particular, enumerators offered different types of assistance to respondents, rushed through different parts of the survey, forgot to use show cards, understood questions differently and offered differing definitions of key terms used in the survey. To avoid this problem, in 2015 the PAPI team took on recommendations by Cuong Viet Nguyen, Nga Thu Nguyen and Tung Duc Phung (2015) on the need for a training of trainers task force. Due to the costs involved in setting up a separate training team to go to all 63 provinces to train enumerators, the institutions involved in the research decided to strengthen the quality of the training of trainers. Field controllers were trained and retrained for three days on the tablet-based survey approach, technical issues with using tablets for PAPI surveys, the questionnaire content, standard training procedures, a standard interview demonstration, fieldwork interview settings, writing journals about field happenings, how to handle field problems and how to treat local support officials. The field controllers could then provide training for the enumerators in each of the survey locations.

Change 3: Improving Fieldwork. In order to improve the fieldwork performance, team leaders and enumerators went through a number of training courses. Several scenarios were raised so that the team could familiarize themselves with problems that may occur and how to solve these problems. The activities that were practiced included: 1) How to set up an interview venue; 2) How to distribute jobs and responsibilities among interviewers; 3) Reactions to problems that affect the interview environment and privacy; and 4) How to deliver an introduction of the PAPI survey to respondents. The team leaders became training assistants, focusing on observing pair-interviews, checking completed questionnaires and correcting interviewers’ mistakes. The first provincial roll-outs of the survey were also observed by one of the core PAPI team members, who travelled with the survey teams to oversee the process and tie up any loose ends. With the real-time monitoring system and data collected instantly from the first five provinces, key PAPI technical experts could examine data quality before rolling out the survey in all 63 provinces.

Change 4: New Questions. Discussions at the 2014 PAPI launch and afterwards revealed that it was time to improve the questionnaire to enhance measurement of the quality of public administration and initiate new research projects. In 2015, a number of new questions were therefore included. These included questions on public opinion of the death penalty, civic knowledge of the country’s leaders, citizen access to information through the Internet and mobile phone services, and accessibility of local government web portals for procedural advice on administrative procedures. The results of these questions have been discussed in this report.
Change 5: Randomized Battery of Knowledge Questions. One of the areas in the survey that can be used for pre-preparation include knowledge-based questions, such as knowledge of the corruption law and knowledge of grassroots democracy decrees. To sort out ‘real’ citizen knowledge from knowledge gained from pre-preparation, the team used a battery of knowledge-based questions that have not been used before and randomly assigned these to respondents. Answering these incorrectly, but older knowledge questions correctly, revealed signs of pre-preparation. With the use of the tablet-based approach, this helped to detect and reduce unexpected data noise.

Change 6: New Commune Selection. While revisiting communes does provide a panel for comparison over time, it may allow local officials to target specific locations and artificially enhance their PAPI scores. To reduce this risk, the PAPI team decided to resample communes, using the ‘probability proportional to size’ approach. This allowed for new respondents and avoided the potential of local officials targeting communes for pre-survey preparation. To maintain a panel, the commune which holds the district capital was retained, and thus all villages in that commune were retained. The team resampled one third of the total villages in 2015, which allowed a comparison of panel and non-panel villages to inform future PAPI sampling strategies. The change had the effect of dramatically reducing the number of people who had already taken the survey to 7%. Looking at the differences between respondents who answered the survey before and those who did not suggests that this change should have a large impact. Figure B shows the average scores with 95% confidence intervals for each dimension, depending on whether or not the respondent has taken the survey before. As the figure shows, those who have taken the survey before are much more likely to rate their provincial government more highly than those who have never taken part in the survey.

Figure B: Average PAPI Score Based on Whether Respondent Has Previously Participated in PAPI

These figures are derived using the design weights. The raw numbers are about 18% of respondents taking the survey before in 2014, compared with 15% in 2015.
Implementing Partners

**Centre for Community Support & Development Studies (CECODES)**

Established by the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) from 2007, CECODES is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation specialised in development research and community support. The overall function of CECODES is to carry out evidence-based research to assess policy impact and to implement solutions to strengthening capacity of communities. CECODES works towards contributing to the improvement of governance performance, focusing on facilitating the interactions between the State, the Market, and the Civil Society.

**Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)**

Established on 28 December 2012 under Decision No. 1725/QĐ-MTTW-BTT by the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF), the Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front is an autonomous agency operating by state laws and regulations. VFF-CRT has the four mandates, including: (i) to provide training and retraining of VFF personnel from all levels; (ii) to conduct research on theory and practice of great solidarity, institutional settings and operation of the VFF and other relevant areas and thematic issues; (iii) to set up and operationalise VFF Museum; (iv) to coordinate and partner with other research and training institutions home and abroad in research and personnel training.

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

UNDP is the United Nations’ global development organization, a network advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As countries develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and its wide range of partners.

**Co-funding Partner**

**Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft**
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

**Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC**
“Amidst public administration reforms in Viet Nam, it is essential to review the performance of the Government and local governments in state management and functioning. With seven years of implementation in Viet Nam, PAPI has provided a wealth of useful data and has acted as a channel to provide citizens’ voices and feedback to the Government and local governments. PAPI findings have substantially supported the National Assembly, the Government and local authorities in monitoring the effectiveness of socio-economic policies and promoting sustainable development in Viet Nam.”

Ms Lê Thị Nga
National Assembly Delegate, Vice Chairwoman of the Judicial Committee of the National Assembly

“At the local level, after five years of implementation, PAPI has become an important tool to provide user feedback on the performance of governance and public administration of local authorities and public administration agencies. With the increasing significance it plays, PAPI needs to be continued and should be welcomed as it provides local governments with motivation to improve their performance and competencies, contributing to the development of the country.”

Mr Nguyễn Văn Hùng
Vice Director, Da Nang Institute for Socio-Economic Development

“After five years of nationwide surveys, PAPI annual reports have become useful tools to reflect objective citizen feedback and perspectives on the performance of the public sector and local governments across all 63 provinces. In particular, PAPI has provided a reliable source of information and data for policy discussions on institutional and public administration reforms in our Academy’s high-level leadership and executive training programmes.”

Professor, Dr Tạ Ngọc Tần
President of the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics

“Thirty years of Doi Moi reforms have made Vietnam a remarkable development success story. The country’s extreme poverty rate has declined from close to 60 percent in the early 1990s to three percent today. Regarding several human development indicators, Vietnam is on par with countries with much higher levels of income. However, the reform agenda needs to be pursued to ensure further development in many areas. Vietnam needs to improve its governance to help boost accountability and transparency and to create opportunities for citizen feedback on the performance of the public administration. PAPI has proven to be an effective measure to achieve this purpose. Switzerland is pleased to collaborate with UNDP in supporting this important initiative.”

H.E. Ms Beatrice Maser Mallor
Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland